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1. The title adopts a phrase used by Neil Hamilton to describe the evolution of rightto-farm laws across the country. Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting the Law: Personal
Reflections on Thirty Years of Change in Agricultural Legislation, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV.
563, 577–78 (2013) (“[T]he reality is that many states took the idea and applied it much
broadly to protect any livestock facility meeting regulatory requirements, even those in
existence after the neighboring homes. This action, in effect, turned the laws into a ‘right
to commit nuisance’ rather than a right to farm.”).
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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of disputes between neighboring property owners,
changing societal values and public policy concerns have shaped both
common law nuisance and environmental law. In particular, disputes
over agricultural land use provide an important touchstone for the
evolution of property rights within a developing society. The
underlying conflict between agricultural production and the property
rights of neighboring landowners was evident in early English
2
common law. In William Aldred’s Case, the Court of the King’s
Bench recognized “[a]n action on the case lies for erecting a hogstye
3
so near the house of the plaintiff that the air thereof was corrupted.”
A seminal case in nuisance law dating back to 1611, William Aldred’s
Case helped form the foundation of nuisance law in the early common
4
law.
Prior to the enactment of comprehensive environmental laws in
the United States, the legal system relied principally on tort law
remedies—such as those provided in William Aldred’s Case—to
5
rectify environmental harms in this country. Even after the advent of
environmental statutes, the common law of nuisance continues to
provide an important legal tool for aggrieved landowners seeking to
6
protect their asserted right to the enjoyment of their property. In
North Carolina, the development and evolution of nuisance law as it
relates to agriculture provides insight into the changing landscape of
agricultural production in the state, as well as the relationship
between common and statutory law. New laws restricting nuisance
claims against agricultural producers unduly restrict the property
rights of neighboring landowners and raise serious constitutional
concerns.

2. William Aldred’s Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b.
3. Id. at 816; 9 Co. Rep. at 57 b.
4. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some
Historic Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765–71 (1979)
(discussing the development of nuisance law in English common law).
5. Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection of Tort
and Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 737, 738–39 (2011).
6. See id. at 753–54.
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The development of industrial agriculture in North Carolina has
imposed an enormous environmental burden on rural communities.
Over the past several decades, the agricultural industry in the state
has transitioned from small, family farms to large industrial facilities,
7
especially within the livestock industry. As a result, these industrial
facilities, housing hundreds—if not thousands—of animals, have
8
become concentrated in certain rural communities. Reports from
rural residents living near industrial hog facilities reveal the burden
placed on these communities:
On the coastal plain of eastern North Carolina, families in
certain rural communities daily must deal with the piercing,
acrid odor of hog manure—reminiscent of rotten eggs and
ammonia—wafting from nearby industrial hog farms. On bad
days, the odor invades homes, and people are often forced to
cover their mouths and noses when stepping outside.
Sometimes, residents say, a fine mist of manure sprinkles
9
nearby homes, cars, and even laundry left on the line to dry.
These and other anecdotal reports provide compelling evidence of
10
ongoing environmental harm. However, over 400 years after
William Aldred’s Case, landowners living near these agricultural
operations in North Carolina no longer enjoy the same protections
under common law nuisance.
In response to growing concerns about the encroachment of
urban development on agricultural communities, North Carolina and
other states across the country enacted “right-to-farm” (“RTF”) laws
11
to protect existing agricultural operations from nuisance actions.
Enacted in 1979, the original North Carolina RTF law provided
preexisting agricultural operations with an affirmative defense to

7. See infra notes 36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
9. Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North Carolina,
121 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A182, A183 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC3672924/?report=reader [https://perma.cc/FGD3-EYAJ].
10. See Letter from EarthJustice to Gina McCarthy, EPA Administrator, at 18–33
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/North-Carolina-EJ-Networket-al-Complaint-under-Title-VI.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACL-PEUQ] (stating the grounds
for a Title VI Civil Rights Act complaint against the North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and documenting the adverse impacts of swine
concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”) on residents in eastern North
Carolina).
11. See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 118
& n.108 (1983).
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liability in a nuisance action, subject to certain limitations. As
interpreted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the 1979 RTF
law codified a “coming to the nuisance” defense for preexisting
agricultural operations, designed to discourage subsequent residential
13
landowners from bringing nuisance claims against such facilities.
While the original justification for RTF laws may have seemed
reasonable at the outset, some states have extended these statutory
14
protections well beyond their originally intended purpose. As a
result, many of these amended RTF statutes have effectively created
15
a “right to commit nuisance” as opposed to a “right to farm.”
The extensive protections afforded to agricultural facilities under
RTF laws call the underlying justification for these laws into question.
RTF laws not only interfere with the property rights of neighboring
16
landowners, but may also restrict the efficient allocation of land
17
use and render agricultural producers less sensitive to the effect of
18
their operations on rural communities. The relative impact of these
19
laws on agricultural nuisance suits has been difficult to quantify. In
light of the continuing development of industrial agriculture, some
courts, including the North Carolina Court of Appeals, have narrowly
interpreted RTF statutes to address the equitable concerns of
20
neighboring landowners. Thus, in spite of the statutory protections
under RTF laws, some plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing successful

12. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140–41 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700 to -701 (2015)). See Grossman & Fischer, supra
note 11, at 119.
13. See Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985); Grossman
& Fischer, supra note 11, at 119–20.
14. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78; David Bennett, Right to Farm Laws Being
Tweaked Across Nation, DELTA FARM PRESS (Aug. 7, 2013), http://deltafarmpress.com
/government/right-farm-laws-being-tweaked-across-nation?page=1 [https://perma.cc/L7GC4CEY] (noting Attorney Rusty Rumley’s views on various states’ RTF laws).
15. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78.
16. See Terence J. Centner, Nuisances from Animal Feeding Operations: Reconciling
Agricultural Production and Neighboring Property Rights, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 5, 6 &
n.7 (2006); Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78; Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to
Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1738 (1998).
17. See Centner, supra note 16, at 6–7 & n.10.
18. Id. at 6–7; Joshua M. Duke & Scott A. Malcolm, Legal Risk in Agriculture: Rightto-Farm Laws and Institutional Change, 75 AGRIC. SYS. 295, 299 (2002) (observing that
the existence of right-to-farm acts could create a perception of invulnerability from
nuisance actions among agricultural producers that would affect decisions regarding farm
management).
19. Duke & Malcolm, supra note 18, at 298–99, n.2 (noting the difficulty in obtaining
data on unpublished cases or the number of agricultural nuisance suits filed and resulting
uncertainty regarding the deterrent effect of such laws).
20. See infra Section II.C.
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21

nuisance actions against agricultural facilities. In response, several
state legislatures have expanded their RTF laws to effectively codify a
“right to commit nuisance” for agricultural facilities at the expense of
22
neighboring landowners and the surrounding communities.
Recent events in North Carolina shed light on this developing
trend. On July 18, 2013, North Carolina enacted significant
amendments to its RTF law, drastically expanding the protections
23
from nuisance actions available to agricultural facilities. Under the
amended RTF law, an agricultural operation may raise an affirmative
defense to liability in a nuisance action regardless of whether it had
24
undergone a change in ownership, size, or type of product produced.
As a result, agricultural operations may be able to benefit from these
protections regardless of whether the facility actually preceded its
25
neighboring landowners.
The legislation was enacted only weeks after the initial filings of
nuisance suits against Murphy-Brown, LLC, a subsidiary of the pork
26
producer Smithfield Foods, Inc., for the operation of industrial hog
27
facilities in eastern North Carolina. Over 400 plaintiffs filed claims

21. See discussion infra Sections II.B, II.C.
22. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78; infra Section III.A (discussing recent
nuisance litigation and resulting legislative proposals).
23. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858–59
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2015)).
24. Id. The amended law also provides that a forestry or agricultural facility that
employs a new technology or interrupts operations for less than three years may still
benefit from the affirmative defense to nuisance actions under the RTF law. Id.
25. See id.; infra notes 209–220 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the
changes within the amended statute).
26. Smithfield Foods is a $15 billion global food company, considered to be the
world’s largest pork processor and hog producer. Company Profile & History,
SMITHFIELD FOODS, http://www.smithfieldfoods.com/about-smithfield/company-profile
[https://perma.cc/V9SQ-AAJA]. In 2013, the Chinese company Shuanghui International
purchased Smithfield for $4.7 billion dollars. Christopher Doering, Smithfield Shareholders
OK $4.7B Sale to China Firm, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/24/smithfield-vote-china-deal/2859551/
[https://perma.cc/3HB5-YGDU].
27. See Request for Prelitigation Mediation of Farm Nuisance Dispute, Exhibit B,
Blanks v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 13-R-685 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 3, 2013); Will
Michaels, N.C. Hog Farm Neighbors File Nuisance Complaints, WUNC (July 8, 2013),
http://wunc.org/post/nc-hog-farm-neighbors-file-nuisance-complaints#stream/0 [https://
perma.cc/LBW3-U3U8]. Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff is required to file a request
for prelitigation mediation prior bringing an agricultural nuisance suit. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-38.3(d) (2015). Indeed, a comparison of the timeline of the litigation to that of the
proposed legislation suggests that the legislation was modified to ensure its applicability to
the pending litigation. See infra notes 206–208 and accompanying text.
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in North Carolina state court against Murphy-Brown. The cases
were subsequently re-filed in the United States District Court for the
29
Eastern District of North Carolina. The district court has issued
30
preliminary rulings, and, as of the writing of this Comment, the
31
cases remain pending. Murphy-Brown has expressly raised the
North Carolina RTF statute as an affirmative defense to liability in
32
the pending litigation.
These cases may provide one of the first opportunities for courts
to interpret North Carolina’s recently amended RTF law. In contrast
to the landowner in William Aldred’s Case, some or all of these
neighboring landowners could find themselves without a legal
remedy. However, the exact scope of the protections afforded to
28. The complaints were originally filed in the North Carolina Superior Court, Wake
County, on July 30, 2013. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Alderman v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No.
13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 2013). The complaints included as defendants both
the “integrator” company that owned the hogs, Murphy-Brown, LLC, and various “local
growers” who owned or operated the facilities where the hogs were raised. See id. at 4. In
total, twenty-five complaints were filed in state court, including approximately 440
individual plaintiffs. See Motion to Designate Case as Exceptional at 2, Alderman v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2013). The plaintiffs
subsequently motioned to dismiss without prejudice the claims against the “local growers.”
See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Notice of Partial Dismissal at 1, Alderman v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
No. 13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2013).
29. With the remaining state court lawsuits pending, the Plaintiffs commenced the
filing of federal lawsuits on August 21, 2014. See, e.g., Complaint, McMillon v. MurphyBrown, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-00155-BO, (E.D.N.C. Aug. 21, 2014). The plaintiffs
subsequently served and filed motions to dismiss without prejudice for the twenty-five
pending cases in state court pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Plaintiff’s Notice of
Partial Dismissal, supra note 28, at 1; Plaintiff’s Notice of Dismissal at 1, Alderman v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2014).
30. In re N.C. Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84714, at *16–17 (E.D.N.C. June 29, 2015) (granting in part and denying in part
defendant’s motion to strike contents of the plaintiff’s complaints, ordering plaintiff to
strike all references to Chinese government in legal arguments, photographs, and
declarations); In re N.C. Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83157, at *78, *80 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for “annoyance” damages associated with temporary nuisance).
31. As of the date of this writing, twenty-six lawsuits are pending in the Eastern
District of North Carolina, all of which name Murphy-Brown, LLC as the sole defendant.
The complaints encompass over 500 individual named plaintiffs. See Motion to Designate
Case as Exceptional, supra note 28, at 2. The lawsuits have been organized under the
matter styled as In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR (E.D.N.C.).
See, e.g., In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83157, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2015).
32. See, e.g., Answer to Amended Complaint at 51, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC,
No. 7:14-CV-185-BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF no. 43 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are barred,
in whole or in part, by North Carolina’s Right to Farm Act . . . . Murphy-Brown states that,
upon information and belief, the farm at issue began operations more than one year
before Plaintiffs’ alleged causes of action arose and that operations at that farm were
reasonable and not a nuisance at the time they began.”).
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agricultural facilities under the recently amended statute remains
uncertain pending further judicial review.
33
Contrary to the original legislative intent, North Carolina’s
RTF statute in its current form fails to strike an appropriate balance
between protecting the state’s farmland and preserving the inherent
right of neighboring landowners to the enjoyment of their property.
This Comment addresses the potential limitations placed on plaintiffs
seeking to bring a nuisance claim against a neighboring agricultural
facility in North Carolina. It also evaluates the constitutional concerns
raised by the recent amendments to the RTF statute and advocates
for a narrower reading of the statute in light of its underlying purpose.
This Comment will proceed in four Parts. Part I will address the
changing nature of the agricultural industry in North Carolina. Part II
will discuss the original enactment of North Carolina’s RTF law and
its subsequent interpretation in the courts. Part III will then examine
the passage of the 2013 amendments to the law and potential
statutory interpretations of the amended statute. Finally, Part IV will
present the constitutional concerns raised by the North Carolina RTF
law and advocate for a narrow judicial interpretation.
I. THE CHANGING NATURE OF AGRICULTURE IN NORTH
CAROLINA
While the preservation of farmland and agriculture remains a
34
valid concern, the broad protections afforded to agricultural
facilities under the RTF law ignore the current realities of agricultural
production within North Carolina, particularly in regard to livestock
35
production. Over the past fifty years, livestock production in the
United States has shifted from traditional family farms toward mass
36
industrial production. To benefit from the resulting economies of
scale, producers have moved away from raising livestock in
traditional pastoral settings towards raising animals within

33. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. As originally enacted, the North
Carolina RTF law codified a “coming to the nuisance” defense for preexisting agricultural
and forestry facilities. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 118–19, 119 n.109. As
discussed in Section III.B, the amended RTF law would permit a much greater number of
facilities to benefit from these protections. See infra Section III.B.
34. See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing loss of
farmland and farms in North Carolina).
35. See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1736–37.
36. See Vanessa Zboreak, “Yes, in Your Backyard!”: Model Legislative Efforts to
Prevent Communities from Excluding CAFOs, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 147, 147–49
(2015) (discussing industrialization of agriculture in the United States).
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“concentrated animal feeding operations” (“CAFOs”). Containing
38
hundreds—if not thousands—of animals at a time, CAFOs are a far
39
cry from the hog sty in William Aldred’s Case, posing serious
environmental and public health threats to not only neighboring
40
landowners but also surrounding community.
Examining the
transformation of the hog industry in North Carolina provides insight
into the impact of CAFOs on their neighboring communities.
A. The Rise of CAFOs and the Transformation of the Hog Industry in
North Carolina
Within North Carolina, the industrialization of agriculture has
41
been most apparent in the development of industrial hog farming.
Beginning in the 1970s, the hog industry changed rapidly as it began
to implement the CAFO model for hog production, which had
42
already been successfully implemented in the poultry industry. The
rapid expansion of hog farming in North Carolina was largely driven
43
by the vertical integration of the livestock industry. The co-location
of large processing and production facilities has resulted in an
unprecedented concentration of hog farms within eastern North
44
Carolina. In 1982, there was at least one commercial hog farm in all
45
but one county in the state. By 1997, however, ninety-five percent of

37. Id. at 149. The EPA defines an Animal Feeding Operation (“AFO”) as
“agricultural operations where animals are kept and raised in confined situations.” Animal
Feeding Operations (AFOs), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operationsafos [http://perma.cc/PP67-C6XX]. Medium and large AFOs are classified as CAFOs. 40
C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4), (6) (2015) (defining large and medium CAFOs, respectively). A
medium CAFO may stable or confine between 200 and 699 mature dairy cows or between
750 and 2,499 hogs weighing over 55 pounds. Id. § 122.23(b)(6). There is no upper limit for
large CAFO operations. Id. § 122.23(b)(4).
38. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39. See William Aldred’s Case (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 57b.
40. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A183–A185; Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–57
(discussing the effect of CAFOs on environmental and public health).
41. See John D. Burns, Comment, The Eight Million Little Pigs–A Cautionary Tale:
Statutory and Regulatory Responses to Concentrated Hog Farming, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 851, 854–56 (1996) (discussing the development of the hog industry in North
Carolina).
42. See id. at 854 n.28; Shi-Ling Hsu, Scale Economies, Scale Externalities: Hog
Farming and the Changing American Agricultural Industry, 94 OR. L. REV. 23, 30–34
(2015) (describing transformation of the hog industry toward contract farming and largescale production); Nicole, supra note 9, at A186.
43. Burns, supra note 41, at 854–55.
44. Id.; see also Nicole, supra note 9, at A185–A186.
45. Nicole, supra note 9, at A185–A186.
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46

the commercial hog farms were located in eastern North Carolina.
47
Currently, there are nearly 9 million hogs in the state. In 2012,
North Carolina ranked second in hog production in the United States,
48
with its yearly production valued at $2.9 billion.
While industrial hog facilities represent a substantial portion of
the local economy in eastern North Carolina, they fail to provide a
49
sustainable model for agricultural development in the state. The
50
operation of CAFOs has had an adverse impact on small farmers
and has resulted in significant amounts of pollution within the
51
region. As a result of the efficiencies achieved from the economies
of scale, the development of these large industrial facilities has
actually resulted in a decrease in the number of farms, as well as
52
agricultural employment. Large livestock processors within the
vertically integrated system, also known as “integrators,” generally
contract with local growers to raise the animals and operate these
facilities, while retaining ownership of the animals and proscribing
53
strict specifications for their care and treatment. Commentators

46. Id. (citing Bob Edwards & Anthony E. Ladd, From Farms to Factories: The
Environmental Consequences of Swine Industrialization in North Carolina, 1982–2007, in
TWENTY LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY 153 (Kenneth Gould & Tammy
Lewis, eds. 2008)).
47. News Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., March 2016 Hog Report, (March 28, 2016),
http://www.ncagr.gov/stats/release/HogRelease03.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FAZ-TZGV].
Over the past twenty years, the hog population has fluctuated between eight and ten
million animals. N.C. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., NORTH CAROLINA
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 43 (2015).
48. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH12-4, 2012 CENSUS HIGHLIGHTS: HOG AND PIG
FARMING 1 (2014), http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources
/Highlights/Hog_and_Pig_Farming/ [https://perma.cc/4RD6-3KLD].
49. The operation of CAFOs has been sharply criticized for externalizing the costs of
production on surrounding communities, while receiving significant public subsidies. See
Michelle B. Nowlin, Sustainable Production of Swine: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 37 VT. L.
REV. 1079, 1096–101 (2013) (providing a general critique of the economic model for
CAFOs).
50. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A185; Burns, supra note 41, at 857.
51. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186; Burns, supra note 41, at 857–61 (discussing the
environmental impact of industrial hog farming and its effect on North Carolina’s fisheries
and tourism industry).
52. Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1135–36 (noting that hog CAFO construction creates a
net job loss, while investment and profits from the projects largely bypass local
communities); Burns, supra note 41, at 857 (noting that industrial hog facilities are less
labor intensive and more centralized making it difficult for small independent growers to
continue operating). For example, between 1991 and 1996, the number of hog farms in
North Carolina decreased by 2,200. Burns, supra note 41, at 857.
53. See Zboreak, supra note 36, at 149 (describing the common ownership structure
and control within the vertically integrated model).
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have criticized these integrators for taking advantage of local growers
54
who are bound by these contractual obligations.
The current waste management system employed by most swine
CAFOs releases enormous quantities of untreated animal waste into
the environment, posing serious environmental and public health
55
threats to the surrounding communities. In most swine CAFOs,
waste is collected in large, underground pits beneath the slatted floors
56
where the hogs are kept. The CAFO operators periodically pump
water through the storage area to flush the accumulated swine waste
57
into large, open-air holding ponds, often referred to as “lagoons.”
These open-air storage ponds often store millions of gallons of swine
58
waste. The waste slurry stored in these lagoons contains high levels
59
of nutrients as well as pathogens and bacteria. The untreated swine
waste is then sprayed, or otherwise land-applied, over designated
60
“spray fields” surrounding the facility.
The resulting pollution is compounded by the sheer amount of
waste produced at these facilities. Each hog can produce up to eight
61
times as much waste as a human. The swine population in North
Carolina is estimated to generate more waste in one year than the
human populations of New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles
62
combined. These facilities cause air, water, and odor pollution
affecting not only neighboring properties, but also communities

54. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 1, at 588 (noting that action is needed to “increase
the protection for contract poultry and livestock growers to provide fair and equitable
treatment and how to limit the use of ‘independent contractor’ claims by integrators to
avoid legal responsibilities”); Nathaniel Haas, John Oliver vs. Chicken, POLITICO, (Jun. 1,
2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/john-oliver-vs-chicken-118510 [https://
perma.cc/79ZG-5TYE] (discussing recent criticism of U.S. poultry production by comedian
John Oliver and recent attempts by Congress to fund a USDA program to provide
contract growers with additional protections).
55. Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–53.
56. Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1087.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1084.
59. Id. at 1085.
60. Id. at 1087. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186.
61. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186 (noting that hogs can produce between four to
eight times as much waste as a human); Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1087 (noting that hogs
produce approximately two to four times as much waste as a human).
62. See Hsu, supra note 42, at 43 (citing KATHRYN COCHRAN, JOSEPH RUDEK &
DANIEL WHITTLE, DOLLARS AND SENSE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE
HOG WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 7 (2000)). Using data from 2002, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) estimated that the 7.5 million hogs located
in five contiguous counties in eastern North Carolina produced approximately 15.5 million
tons of waste that year. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-944,
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 21 (2008).
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located miles upwind or downstream of these facilities. Swine
CAFOs reduce neighboring property values and emit pollutants that
64
threaten the physical and mental health of surrounding residents.
The concentration of these facilities within low-income and minority
communities in eastern North Carolina has also raised significant
65
environmental injustice concerns.
While state regulators and hog producers have attempted to
address some of these concerns, those efforts have been insufficient to
remedy the environmental impact of swine CAFOs on their
66
neighboring communities. Following growing opposition to the
operation of these facilities, North Carolina imposed a temporary
moratorium on the construction of new industrial swine CAFOs in
67
1997. In 2007, the state enacted a permanent ban on new hog
facilities utilizing the traditional lagoon and spray field waste
68
management system. However, these restrictions on swine facilities
63. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186–A187; Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–57;
Burns, supra note 41, at 861–64 (discussing the effects of water pollution from agricultural
discharges and catastrophic spills from hog facilities in North Carolina).
64. Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–52. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A183–A185, A187;
R. Jason Richards & Erica L. Richards, Cheap Meat: How Factory Farming Is Harming
Our Health, the Environment, and the Economy, 4 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT.
RESOURCES. L. 31, 38–39 (2012) (discussing the reduction of property values near hog
CAFOs).
65. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A183–A184. In February 2015, the Environmental
Protection Agency launched a civil rights investigation into potential violations associated
with state regulation of these facilities. EPA Launches Investigation of North Carolina for
Civil Rights Violations, EARTHJUSTICE (Feb. 25, 2015), http://earthjustice.org/news/press
/2015/epa-launches-investigation-of-north-carolina-for-civil-rights-violations-0 [https://
perma.cc/S7BU-VMFG].
66. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A188–A189 (discussing recent reforms and existing
criticisms). In 2011, the general assembly passed legislation that permitted hog producers
to upgrade their buildings without improving their waste management systems as required
under the original moratorium. Act of June 13, 2011, ch. 118, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 220,
220–21 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-806 (2015)).
67. Nicole, supra note 9, at A188.
68. Id. The Swine Farm Environmental Performance Act of 2007 required all new or
expanded facilities to adopt “environmentally superior technologies” (“ESTs”) to
significantly reduce emissions and eliminate waste discharges into surface and ground
waters. Act of Aug. 31, 2007, ch. 523, sec. 1, § 143-215.10I, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1678,
1678–79 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.10I (2015)). The Act also
established a lagoon conversion program to provide funding to farmers to convert their
existing lagoons to implement ESTs. Id. § 1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws. at 1680–83. Only two
projects have been successfully completed under the program to date, however, and the
general assembly has largely stripped the program of funding. See, e.g., N.C. DIVISION OF
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
COMMISSION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAGOON CONVERSION PROGRAM 4 (2015), http://www.ncleg
.net/documentsites/committees/ERC/ERC%20Reports%20Received/2015/Department%20of
%20Agriculture%20and%20Consumer%20Services/2015-Oct%20Lagoon%20Conv%20Prog
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were notably weakened in recent years. Hog producers are now
permitted to upgrade their existing facilities and recommence using
many idled facilities without having to make improvements to the
69
existing waste management systems. Even though alternative waste
management technologies can and have been successfully
implemented, the large majority of facilities continue to use the
traditional “lagoon” and “spray field” system, citing cost as a primary
70
concern.
Swine CAFOs remain a significant threat to the
environment and public health within their surrounding
71
communities. In light of the environmental and social harm
associated with these facilities, providing extensive protections for
72
CAFOs under the RTF law loses much of its justification.
B. Making the Case Against Extending RTF Protections to CAFOs:
North Carolina as a Cautionary Tale
For those making the case against extending RTF protections to
CAFOs, North Carolina serves as a cautionary tale. Commentators
have argued that CAFOs should be excluded altogether from the
73
nuisance protections afforded under RTF laws. In a 1997 opinion
%20Rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FRT-N8V4]. While a few facilities have successfully
implemented ESTs, the overwhelming majority of existing hog farms still operate using
the traditional lagoon and spray field system. Nicole, supra note 9, at A188–A189.
69. Act of June 13, 2011, ch. 118, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 220, 220–21 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-806 (2015)). In 2011, the general assembly passed
legislation that permitted hog producers to upgrade their buildings without improving
their waste management systems, as required under the original moratorium. Id. In
addition, the previous regulations provided an exception for idled swine facilities to restart
operations under the existing waste management system, provided that the facility had
been out of operation for less than four years. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE. 2T.1302 (2015).
However, the legislature recently extended this statutory exception from four to ten years.
Act of Sept. 30, 2015, ch. 263, sec. 16, § 21(a), 2015 N.C. Sess. Law 513, 513–14. This
change has raised concerns about the potential impact on neighboring landowners. See
Gabe Rivin, Bills Allow Idled Hog Farms to Return Under Old Environmental Standards,
N.C. HEALTH NEWS (May 22, 2015), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2015/05/22
/bills-allow-idled-hog-farms-to-return-under-old-environmental-standards/ [https://perma
.cc/F4UK-WL95].
70. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A188–A189; Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1121–28
(discussing the successful implementation of improved waste management systems).
71. See Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1086–96 (documenting the adverse environmental
and public health effects from industrial hog production).
72. See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738 (stating that “[a]s envisioned, RTFs are
intended to preserve open space and protect traditional rural life from urban
encroachment,” but currently are used to “protect land users who themselves have
contributed to a decline in the quality of rural living”).
73. See, e.g., Centner, supra note 16, at 11 (suggesting the implementation of size
limitations for facilities that may qualify for nuisance protection or requirements to
comply with best practices for odor and nutrient management); Neil D. Hamilton, Right-
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letter, the Kentucky attorney general addressed whether industrial
hog facilities could be operated in a “reasonable and prudent”
74
manner so as to gain protection under Kentucky’s RTF law. In
considering whether such facilities should be protected under the
statute, he noted the experience of industrial hog farming in North
Carolina gave reason for pause:
The experience of North Carolina persuades us that the
practice of industrial-scale hog farming is neither reasonable
nor prudent. In our state, an agricultural disaster is one that
strikes the agricultural community, usually from acts of nature.
In North Carolina, an agricultural disaster has come to signify a
disaster that strikes the community at large from acts of an
agricultural producer. We do not believe that any industrial
process that, intentionally or not, dumps tons of animal waste
75
into rivers and streams can be called reasonable or prudent.
Reaching this conclusion in 1997, the attorney general drew heavily
on the catastrophic 1995 hog waste spill in North Carolina, where a
storage lagoon ruptured at Oceanview Farms, dumping nearly
76
twenty-five million gallons of hog waste into the New River. He
further noted the water pollution caused by waste leaching from the
lagoons as well as the airborne pollution associated with hog
77
production at these facilities.
The attorney general offered textual support for his decision
based on the stated purpose of the Kentucky RTF law “to conserve,
protect, and encourage the development and improvement of its
78
agricultural land.” Drawing from this statement of purpose, which is
79
strikingly similar to that of the North Carolina’s RTF law, he argued
to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural
Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103, 111–12 (1998) (describing the
emergence of a “new attitude” towards industrialized swine production); Burns, supra
note 41, at 881.
74. Op. Att’y Gen. Ky., No. 97-31, at 8–9 (Aug. 21, 1997), http://ag.ky.gov/civil/civilenviro/opinions/Pages/1997.aspx [https://perma.cc/HX73-Q2B5].
75. Id.
76. Id. at 7–8; see Michael A. Mallin, Impacts of Industrial Animal Production on
Rivers and Estuaries, 88 AM. SCIENTIST 2, 6 (2000).
77. Op. Att'y Gen. Ky., supra note 74, at 8.
78. Id. at 5 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(1) (West 2015)).
79. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(1) (West 2015) (“It is the declared
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, protect, and encourage the development and
improvement of its agricultural land and silvicultural land for the production of food,
timber, and other agricultural and silvicultural products.”), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106700 (2015) (“It is the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect and encourage
the development and improvement of its agricultural land and forestland for the
production of food, fiber, and other products.”).
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that extending protections to such facilities would run contrary to the
80
stated intent of the RTF law. In rejecting a broader interpretation of
the statute, he noted that “[i]t is the cultivation and management of
our land for agricultural operations that the legislature sought to
protect, not the laboratories of science or the concrete buildings of
81
manufacturing industries.”
While some states have enacted reforms or adopted statutory
interpretations to limit the application of these protections to
82
CAFOs, other states, such as North Carolina, have extended
protections for such facilities either under the RTF statutes or by
83
other means. Reviewing the development of nuisance law in North
Carolina and interpretations of the RTF law prior to its amendment
in 2013 will help place the protections afforded to CAFOs in context.
II. NORTH CAROLINA’S RTF ACT
The origins of North Carolina’s RTF law lie in the historical
development of common law nuisance and its application to
agricultural facilities. Tracing the development and interpretation of
nuisance law in North Carolina provides valuable context in which to
assess the statutory protections provided under the state’s amended
RTF law. This Section will provide a discussion of the development of
nuisance law in North Carolina and the statutory protections
provided under the state’s original RTF law.
A. Development and Interpretation of Nuisance Law in North
Carolina
84

Nuisance law has its historical roots in English common law.
85
William Aldred’s Case represents one of the landmark cases in
nuisance law. Establishing the common law principle of sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas, William Aldred’s Case recognized that the use
of one’s property should be limited so as not to injure that of
86
another. In rejecting the defendant’s claim that the social utility of

80. Ky. Att’y Gen., supra note 74, at 6–7.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19 (West 2015) (limiting the application of the
RTF to facilities with a capacity of less than 1,000 swine or 2,500 head of cattle).
83. See infra notes 191–202 and accompanying text.
84. See Coquillette, supra note 4, at 765–71 (discussing the evolution of early private
nuisance law in the common law).
85. (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 58 b–59 a.
86. Id. See Coquillette, supra note 4, at 776–81 (discussing the holding in Aldred’s
Case and the underlying principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas).
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hog farming permitted such interference, the court in William
Aldred’s Case noted:
[T]he building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be
built so near a house, that when it burns the smoke thereof
enters into the house, so that none can dwell there, an action
lies for it. So if a man has a watercourse running in a ditch from
the river to his house, for his necessary use; if a glover sets up a
lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins so near the said
watercourse that the corruption of the lime-pit has corrupted it,
for which cause his tenants leave the said house, an action on
the case lies for it . . . and this stands with the rule of law and
87
reason, . . . sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
This concept has served as the guiding principle for the development
88
of nuisance law in the United States, including North Carolina.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has defined a private
nuisance as “any substantial non-trespassory invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of
89
liability forming conduct.” The intentional or unintentional creation
of an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the plaintiff’s
90
property may give rise to an actionable claim. North Carolina courts
have identified two types of private nuisances: nuisance per se (or at
91
law) and nuisance per accidens (or in fact). Nuisance per se is an act,
occupation, or building that constitutes a nuisance under any
87. Aldred’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821; 9 Co. Rep. at 58 b–59 a; see Coquillette, supra
note 4, at 776.
88. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953)
(“The law of private nuisance rests on the concept embodied in the ancient legal maxim
[s]ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, meaning, in essence, that every person should so use
his own property as not to injure that of another.”).
89. Id.; see NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 25.30 (3d ed. 2015); 4
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A private nuisance
is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land.”).
90. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962) (“A person
is subject to liability for an intentional non-trespassory invasion of an interest in the use
and enjoyment of land when his conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances of the
particular case; a person is subject to liability for an unintentional invasion when his
conduct is negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.”); Whiteside Estates, Inc. v. Highlands
Cove, LLC, 146 N.C. App. 449, 455, 553 S.E.2d 431, 436 (2001) (citing Watts, 256 N.C. at
617, 124 S.E.2d at 813); NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 25.30 (3d ed. 2015). The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has defined intentional nuisance within this context to
mean “when the person whose conduct is in question as a basis for liability acts for the
purpose of causing it, or knows that it is resulting from his conduct, or knows that it is
substantially certain to result from his conduct.” Morgan, 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 689.
91. Morgan, 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687; see NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS
§ 25.30 (3d ed. 2015).
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92

circumstances. While the lawful operation of an enterprise does not
93
constitute a nuisance per se, it may still be considered nuisance per
accidens “by reason of [its] location, or by reason of the manner in
94
which [it is] constructed, maintained, or operated.” However, not all
intentional invasions of the use or enjoyment of another’s property
95
constitute a private nuisance.
In order to establish a prima facie case for an intentional private
nuisance, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s use
of the property, under the circumstances, constituted an unreasonable
invasion or interference with the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of his
property and (2) the plaintiff suffered substantial harm or injury as a
96
result. A person may be found liable for creating or maintaining a
private nuisance “regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised by
97
him to avoid such injury.” The determination of reasonableness is a
question of fact that is made from the perspective of an objectively

92. Morgan, 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687 (“A nuisance per se or at law is an act,
occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances,
regardless of location or surroundings.”). Traditional examples of a nuisance per se
include operating a brothel or a gambling parlor. E.g., Tedeseki v. Berger, 43 So. 960, 961
(Ala. 1907) (prostitution); Ehrlick v. Kentucky, 102 S.W. 289, 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907)
(gambling); Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 156 (1885) (prostitution);
Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 85 Pa. Super. 316, 318 (1925) (gambling). A plaintiff bringing
a nuisance action against an agricultural facility under this theory would have to meet a
difficult burden of establishing that the activity in question constitutes a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances. See Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 100, 102
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“Indiana has determined that the raising of hogs is not a nuisance
per se.”); Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-0329-GKF-PJC, 2010 WL 653032, at
*5 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 17, 2010) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss claim under the
theory of nuisance per se, holding that the state failed to establish that the defendant’s
land application of poultry litter constituted a nuisance at all times).
93. Watts, 256 N.C. at 617, 124 S.E.2d at 813.
94. See Morgan, 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687.
95. Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 826 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); e.g., Ewen v. Maccherone, 927 N.Y.S.2d 274,
278 (N.Y. App. Term 2011) (declining to find that secondhand smoke from neighbor who
smoked in own house constituted a nuisance).
96. Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814; Elliott v. Muehlbach, 173 N.C. App.
709, 712, 620 S.E.2d 266, 269 (2005) (citing Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814); see
NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 25.30 (3d ed. 2015). The plaintiff must also have a
sufficient property interest to maintain a nuisance action. Kent v. Humphries, 303 N.C.
675, 678–79, 281 S.E.2d 43, 45–46 (1981) (holding that a plaintiff who had entered into an
invalid lease and tendered rent which was accepted by the landlord had sufficient property
interest in the rented property to maintain a nuisance action).
97. Watts, 256 N.C. at 616, 124 S.E.2d at 813; Morgan, 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at
689; Parker v. Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. 18, 21, 502 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1998) (“[A] defendant's
use of state-of-the-art technology in the operation of a facility or the fact that he was not
negligent in the design or construction of that facility are not defenses to a nuisance
claim.”), rev’d, on other grounds, 351 N.C. 40, 519 S.E.2d 315 (1999).
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reasonable person. The fact finder must consider all of the
circumstances of a particular case and no single factor is
99
determinative. Furthermore, the alleged injury must be considered
substantial and “affect the health, comfort or property of those who
live near . . . . [by causing] some substantial annoyance, some material
100
physical discomfort, or injury to their health or property.”
In contrast to a private nuisance, a public nuisance constitutes an
interference or invasion of rights common to the public, affecting the
local community rather than the private use or enjoyment of one’s
101
property. A plaintiff may pursue an action for a public nuisance
98. Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
(FIRST), § 826 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 1939)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 826 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has expounded
upon this inquiry:
Reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined in each case by weighing the
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the conduct of the
defendant. Determination of the gravity of the harm involves consideration of the
extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff, the social value which the law
attaches to the type of use which is invaded, the suitability of the locality for that
use, the burden on plaintiff to minimize the harm, and other relevant
considerations arising upon the evidence.
Rainey v. St. Lawrence Homes, Inc., 174 N.C. App. 611, 613, 621 S.E.2d 217, 220 (2005)
(quoting Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977)).
99. Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814 (noting broad range of relevant factors
and stating that “[n]o single factor is decisive; all the circumstances in the particular case
must be considered”). Note that while the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Watts
employed the term “conduct” as noted above, the proper focus arguably remains on the
nature of the invasion itself rather than the defendant’s conduct. See NORTH CAROLINA
LAW OF TORTS § 25.30[1] (3d ed. 2015) (citing Morgan, 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 689;
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87–88 (5th ed. 1984)).
100. Watts, 256 N.C. at 617, 124 S.E.2d at 813–14 (quoting Pake v. Morris, 230 N.C.
424, 426, 53 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1949)). Substantial injury must go beyond a “slight
inconvenience or petty annoyance.” Id. at 619, 124 S.E.2d at 815. However, “if one makes
an unreasonable use of his property and thereby causes another substantial harm in the
use and enjoyment of his, the former is liable for the injury inflicted.” Id. at 619, 124
S.E.2d at 815 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 822 cmt. g, j (AM. LAW INST.
1939).
101. State v. Everhardt, 203 N.C. 610, 618, 166 S.E. 738, 742 (1932). The Supreme
Court of North Carolina has defined public nuisance in the following manner:
“To constitute a public nuisance, the condition of things must be such as
injuriously affects the community at large, and not merely one or even a very few
individuals. . . . Whatever tends to endanger life, or generate disease, and affect the
health of the community; whatever shocks the public morals and sense of decency;
whatever shocks the religious feelings of the community, or tends to its
discomfort—is generally, at common law, a public nuisance, and a crime.”
Id. at 618, 166 S.E. at 742 (quoting WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL
LAW 398, 399 (William E. Mikell ed., 3d ed. 1915)). See NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF
TORTS § 25.40 (3d ed. 2015).
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only if he can establish special damages “differing in kind and degree
102
from that suffered in common with the general public.”
Under a nuisance claim, a party may seek a remedy of temporary
103
or permanent damages, as well as injunctive relief. A temporary
104
nuisance claim provides for damages solely related to past harm.
Alternatively, a permanent nuisance claim seeks damages for past,
105
present, and future damages.
In addition, a party may seek
abatement of an ongoing nuisance by injunction. Within the context
of a private intentional nuisance, “[t]he degree of unreasonableness
of the defendants’ conduct determines whether damages or
106
permanent injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy.” A court
will only award injunctive relief in cases where the defendant’s
conduct is found to be unreasonable based upon a finding that the
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the utility to the
107
defendant. However, a court may still award damages even if it
108
does not order injunctive relief.
Dating back to the time of William Aldred’s Case, the application
of nuisance law to agricultural facilities raises critical questions about
how to balance the right to enjoy one’s property with the social utility

102. Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 116, 574
S.E.2d 48, 53 (2002) (holding that riparian waterfront owners and riverkeeper associations
failed to establish special damages in public nuisance suit against hog producers, as
“aesthetic and recreational interests alone” are insufficient to confer standing); Hampton
v. N.C. Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 543–44, 27 S.E.2d 538, 543–44 (1943) (“[N]o individual may
recover damages because of injury by public nuisance, unless he has received a special
damage or unless the creator of the nuisance has thereby invaded some right which, upon
principles of justice and public policy, cannot be considered merged in the general public
right . . . .”); McManus v. S. R. Co., 150 N.C. 537, 540, 64 S.E. 766, 768 (1909).
103. See NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 25.30[1][a] (3d ed. 2015).
104. See id.
105. See Broadbent v. Allison, 176 N.C. App. 359, 370, 626 S.E.2d 758, 766 (2006)
(citing Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566, 570, 58 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1950)) (“When
permanent damages have been awarded, defendants have in effect been granted an
easement to continue operations on their property in the same manner as previously
conducted.”); NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 25.30[1][a] (3d ed. 2015). The award
of permanent damages for a nuisance action will preclude any future recovery for a
plaintiff based on the alleged nuisance in question. Broadbent, 176 N.C. App. at 370, 626
S.E.2d at 766.
106. Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 200, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1985) (citing
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977)); NORTH CAROLINA
LAW OF TORTS § 25.30[1][a] (3d ed. 2015).
107. Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (citing Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293
N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977))(discussing the relevant test for determining
whether injunctive relief is called for in the context of an agricultural nuisance suit against
a neighboring hog farm).
108. Id.
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of agricultural production. North Carolina courts have recognized
actionable claims under both theories of public and private nuisance
110
111
112
resulting from interferences such as noise, smoke, and odors.
Accordingly, the operation of an agricultural facility can give rise to
113
an actionable nuisance claim.
The spread of urban and residential development into
traditionally agricultural communities poses unique challenges under
common law nuisance, and raises concerns about the protection of
114
existing farmland and agricultural facilities. The extension of urban
development into agricultural communities implicates the common
115
law doctrine of “coming to the nuisance.” This doctrine applies in
cases where a plaintiff acquires or improves his land after the creation
116
of the alleged nuisance.
Under common law, a plaintiff is not
automatically precluded from recovery by voluntarily “coming to the

109. The court in William Aldred’s Case succinctly laid out the underlying conflict
between these two conflicting equities, contrasting the defendant’s claim of social utility
that “the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man” with the
right of enjoyment to one’s property. William Aldred’s Case (1611), 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817;
9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 58 b; see Coquillette, supra note 4, at 775–77 (discussing the court’s
treatment of the defendant’s argument based on social utility).
110. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196, 197–98
(4th Cir. 1952) (holding that noise and vibrations associated with the operation of a gas
compressor station constituted a public nuisance under Maryland law); Jones v. Queen
City Speedways, Inc., 276 N.C. 231, 242–43, 172 S.E.2d 42, 50 (1970) (holding that noise
from drag strip racing constituted a private nuisance); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C.
611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962) (holding that noise and vibrations from neighboring
hosiery facility constituted an actionable nuisance); Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N.C. 47, 51,
55 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1949) (recognizing plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief from airport
noise).
111. See, e.g., Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 335
(1883) (affirming a church’s recovery of damages for a nuisance created by a railway
facility’s noise, smoke, and odors); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194–95, 77
S.E.2d 682, 690 (1953) (recognizing actionable nuisance claim for neighboring landowners
against oil refinery due to gases and odors emitted from the facility).
112. See, e.g., Oates v. Algodon Mfg. Co., 217 N.C. 488, 489, 8 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1940)
(recognizing damages for “any inconvenience and annoyance by way of odors suffered by
him to his land”); King v. Ward, 207 N.C. 782, 783–84, 178 S.E. 577, 578–79 (1935)
(affirming damages for loss of enjoyment caused by odors); Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 199,
334 S.E.2d at 490 (recognizing actionable nuisance claim based on odor from neighboring
hog farm).
113. See, e.g., Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 199, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (discussing the operation
of a hog farm as a nuisance).
114. See generally Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 108–10 (discussing the early
application of the coming to the nuisance defense in this context).
115. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co. 494 P.2d 701, 708 (Ariz.
1972) (describing nuisance action brought by a residential developer against a large cattle
feedlot in a traditionally agricultural community).
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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117

nuisance.” However, the priority of use is only one of many factors
that must be taken into account in determining whether the
118
defendant’s use of the property is unreasonable.
Courts have
traditionally protected agricultural operations in rural areas when the
119
neighbor bringing the suit “came to the nuisance.” Nevertheless,
each court retains discretion to determine the relative weight of this
120
For this reason, many states,
factor on a case-by-case basis.
including North Carolina, have provided statutory protections to
further insulate agricultural facilities from nuisance suits.
B.

Enactment of the 1979 RTF Act in North Carolina

In response to concerns over the loss of farmland and
agricultural development, states enacted “right-to-farm” laws to
better protect agricultural operations from urban development. All
121
fifty states currently have RTF laws; the large majority of which
122
RTF laws generally
were first enacted between 1978 and 1983.
protect either agricultural operations from nuisance actions or
prevent zoning and other restrictive local regulations from limiting
123
agricultural activities.
In 1979, the North Carolina legislature enacted one of the first
124
and most influential RTF laws in the country.
The statute’s
117. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618–19, 124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962). See
generally NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 25.30 (3d ed. 2015) (supporting this
approach). The Second Restatement notes that “[o]therwise the defendant by setting up
an activity or a condition that results in the nuisance could condemn all the land in his
vicinity to a servitude without paying any compensation, and so could arrogate to himself
a good deal of the value of the adjoining land.” Id. § 840D cmt. b.
118. Watts, 256 N.C. at 619, 124 S.E.2d at 815.
119. See, e.g., Arbor Theatre Corp. v. Campbell Soup Co., 296 N.E.2d 11, 13–14 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1973); Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 331 P.2d 539, 548 (Kan. 1958). But see Pendoley
v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Mass. 1963) (affirming actionable nuisance claim for
residential community against preexisting hog farm). See generally Grossman & Fischer,
supra note 11, at 108–11 (discussing the early application of the coming to the nuisance
defense in this context). Spur Industries v. Del Webb provides a novel application of the
coming to the nuisance defense within this context, recognizing a cognizable nuisance
claim by a residential developer against a livestock facility, but requiring the developer to
indemnify for the livestock owner for the costs of either moving or shutting down his
facility. 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
120. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 108–10.
121. Harrison M. Pittman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-Farm
Acts, in 8 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS 465, 480 (6th ed. 2005); Hamilton, supra note 73, at
103; see Reinert, supra note 16, at 1707.
122. Reinert, supra note 16, at 1707.
123. See Hamilton, supra note 73, at 104.
124. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 119; see Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140–41 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700–01
(2015)); Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws, in 13 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL
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“declaration of policy,” which has remained largely unchanged since
125
its enactment, clearly states the law’s purpose. In order to further
“the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect and
encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural
land[,]” the Act has the stated purpose of “reduc[ing] the loss to the
State of its agricultural and forestry resources by limiting the
circumstances under which an agricultural or forestry operation may
126
be deemed to be a nuisance.”
In essence, the law enables
defendants to assert a “coming to the nuisance” defense for
preexisting agricultural operations in lawsuits brought by plaintiffs
127
using neighboring properties for non-agricultural uses.
As enacted, the statute provides an affirmative defense to
128
nuisance liability
for preexisting agricultural and forestry
129
An agricultural or forestry operation may raise this
operations.
defense in a private or public nuisance action provided that: (1) the

LAW § 124.02 n.7 (2015); Reinert, supra note 16, at 1707 (noting original portion of the
North Carolina RTF statute is generally considered the model “traditional” statute among
states). At least nineteen states have patterned operative language on the original North
Carolina statute, though some state statutes may still vary significantly. Grossman &
Fischer, supra note 11, at 119–20.
125. See Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, § 106-700, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 441, 441–
43 (codified as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015)).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015).
127. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 118.
128. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(f)(2) (2015) (describing statutory protections as
an “affirmative defense”); Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 253, 451 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1994)
(noting the defendant set forth the North Carolina RTF as an affirmative defense);
Answer to Amended Complaint at 51, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-000185BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF no. 43 (listing the RTF act as an affirmative defense to
liability). When interpreting similar RTF statutes, courts in other jurisdictions have found
that because a state RTF provides an affirmative defense, the burden is on the proponent
of the defense to prove the facts required to support it. See Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509
N.E.2d 850, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the defendant had burden to prove
RTF defense, but the plaintiff had burden of proof for the exception for negligent
operation under the Indiana RTF law); Lima Twp. v. Bateson, 838 N.W.2d 898, 906 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2013) (holding the defendant raising the defense has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence that the challenged conduct is protected under the
Michigan RTF act).
129. Under the statute, “agricultural operation” was defined as “includ[ing], without
limitation, any facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock,
poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(b) (2011). As
amended, the statute also provides protections for “forestry operation[s],” which are
defined as “those activities involved in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees.”
Id. § 701(b1); Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, § 106-700, 701(b1), 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws
441, 441–42 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT § 106-700, 701(b1) (2015)); Act of
July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701(b1), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (b1) (2015)) (removing the phrase “but not
sawmill operations” from § 106-701(b1)).
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facility has been in operation for over one year and (2) the operation
130
was not initially a nuisance. The defendant has the burden of proof
131
in raising this defense. However, the statute contains an exception
that allows plaintiffs to recover damages when an operation causes
water pollution or an overflow of water onto the plaintiff’s
132
property.
Even before the enactment of the 2013 amendments, North
Carolina’s RTF law offered agricultural operations broad protections
from nuisance liability. The law exempted all types of preexisting
agricultural activities from nuisance liability regardless of their nature
133
or size, provided that the required statutory elements are met. This
type of general exemption represented one of the broadest right-tofarm protections available and has been adopted in at least fifteen
134
other states. In addition, the 1979 law further limited the regulation
of such facilities through local zoning regulations, pre-empting all
local ordinances that “would make the operation of any such
agricultural or forestry operation or its appurtenances a nuisance
135
or . . . abatement thereof as a nuisance.” These broad protections
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (2015) (“No agricultural or forestry operation or
any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed
conditions in or about the locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in
operation for more than one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the
operation began.”).
131. See Price v. Conley, 21 N.C. App. 326, 328, 204 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1974) (holding
that the burden of proof generally lies with the party raising an affirmative defense).
However, a plaintiff may have the burden of demonstrating that the nuisance results from
negligent operation of the facility to preclude the defendant from raising this defense. See
infra notes 215–217 and accompanying text.
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(c) (2015) (“The provisions of subsection (a)
shall not affect or defeat the right of any person, firm, or corporation to recover damages
for any injuries or damages sustained by him on account of any pollution of, or change in
condition of, the waters of any stream or on the account of any overflow of lands of any
such person, firm, or corporation.”); Hamilton, supra note 73, § 124.02[2][g] (discussing the
prevalence of such provisions in nuisance-related RTF laws).
133. See § 106-701(a)–(b); Hamilton, supra note 73, § 124.02[2] (describing the scope
of these general exemptions within RTF acts from other states).
134. The following states have adopted similar general exemptions: Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. Hamilton, supra note
73, § 124.02[2]. Other states have incorporated other types of exemptions, including those
related to livestock or agricultural facilities. See generally id. § 124.02[2] (noting a variety
of possible exemptions).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(d) (2015). See Hamilton, supra note 73, § 124.02[2].
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia have
enacted either identical or similar provisions in their right-to-farm laws. Id. Note that as a
result of the 1997 Amendments, a county may adopt limited zoning regulations for large
swine facilities of approximately 4,000 hogs or more. Aaron M. McKown, Note, Hog
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provided neighboring communities with limited measures for
regulating operation of these facilities.
While the breadth of the protections afforded to agricultural
136
facilities under the law has been widely criticized, the underlying
justifications for the RTF law are not without merit. The promotion
of agriculture and preservation of farmland not only protects a vital
137
sector of North Carolina’s economy, but may also prevent urban
138
sprawl and promote a healthy environment. The loss of farms and
farmland remains a serious issue in North Carolina. Between 2002
and 2012, North Carolina lost over 650,000 acres of farmland and
139
thousands of farms. As a result of the industrialization of farming
practices across the nation, only two percent of Americans are
140
directly involved in agricultural production today. These changes in
both the physical and social landscape of the countryside have placed
141
agricultural practices under much greater scrutiny.
In the face of the changing landscape of rural North Carolina, the
protections in place under the RTF law arguably have the potential to
help farmers avoid costly litigation and efficiently resolve conflicts
142
between neighboring landowners.
Given the capital investment
required for farming operations, the litigation of a nuisance dispute
143
may threaten the continued viability of a farming operation.
Conversely, farmers may be less sensitive to the impacts of their
operations on surrounding communities due to the perceived
Farms and Nuisance Law in Parker v. Barefoot: Has North Carolina Become a Hog
Heaven and Waste Lagoon?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2355, 2367 & n.94 (1999) (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153A-340(b)(3) (1997)) (discussing the 1997 amendment and the 4,000 hog
approximation based on 600,000 pound steady live weight limit provided in statute).
136. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738.
137. “North Carolina’s agricultural industry contributes . . . $78 billion to the state’s
economy, accounts for more than 17 percent of the state’s income, and employs 16 percent
of the workforce.” North Carolina Agriculture Overview, N.C. DEP’T AGRIC. &
CONSUMER SERVS., http://www.ncagr.gov/stats/general/overview.htm [https://perma.cc
/24XB-PXR5].
138. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 100.
139. North Carolina Continues to Lose Farms, but Rate of Land Loss Slows,
SOUTHEAST FARM PRESS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://southeastfarmpress.com/miscellaneous
/north-carolina-continues-lose-farms-rate-land-loss-slows [https://perma.cc/P4L8-8EN8].
140. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When do RightTo-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 90 (2006).
141. See id. at 91–93 (discussing the change in the political landscape and resulting
scrutiny on agricultural practices in the United States).
142. See Jacqui Fatka, What Right-to-Farm Laws do for Farmers, FARM FUTURES
(Apr. 3, 2015), http://farmfutures.com/story-right-farm-laws-farmers-17-125832-spx_1
[https://perma.cc/T2CV-HB3N].
143. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 100 (discussing relevant factors in a
farmer’s decision to continue farming on a particular piece of land).
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protections afforded to agricultural operations under RTF laws.
For this reason, commentators have criticized RTF laws as being
overly protective of agricultural facilities to the detriment of the
145
surrounding communities. The following review of the existing case
law regarding North Carolina’s RTF law prior to the 2013
amendments will provide insight into these concerns and the potential
implications of the newly amended law.
C.

Judicial Interpretation of the 1979 RTF Act

Following the enactment of the RTF law in 1979, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized certain limitations on the
availability of statutory protections under the RTF law consistent
with the doctrine of “coming to the nuisance.” While acknowledging
“[i]t is the public policy of North Carolina to encourage farming,
146
farmers, and farmlands,” the court of appeals has interpreted the
original RTF law to provide an affirmative defense only in cases
where the agricultural operation preceded the plaintiff’s non147
agricultural use and the character of the operation did not undergo
148
As interpreted by the courts, these
a fundamental change.
limitations helped to preserve equitable relief for plaintiffs who did
149
not fall within intended scope of the law.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute
to provide a codification of the “coming to the nuisance” defense,
limiting the availability of its protections to preexisting agricultural
150
operations. In Mayes v. Tabor, a private summer camp brought a
nuisance suit against a neighboring hog farm. The summer camp had
been in operation for over sixty years and its current owners preceded
151
the operation of the hog farm. The defendant had been operating
the hog farm for well over one year prior to the commencement of

144. Duke & Malcolm, supra note 18, at 298–99; id. at 100–01.
145. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738.
146. Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 253, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994) (citing
Baucom's Nursery Co. v. Mecklenburg Cty., 62 N.C. App. 396, 398, 303 S.E.2d 236, 238
(1983)); Baucom’s Nursery Co. 62 N.C. App. at 398, 303 S.E.2d at 238 (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 106-550, 139-2, 700, 583 (1983)).
147. See Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985).
148. See Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254–55, 451 S.E.2d at 3–4.
149. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
150. 77 N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985).
151. Id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 489. The summer camp had been in operation for
approximately sixty years. The plaintiffs purchased the summer camp nineteen years
before the commencement of trial. The defendant bought the property fifteen years prior
to the action and began raising 300–500 hogs on the property. Id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490.
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152

the nuisance action and moved for summary judgment on the basis
153
that the nuisance action was barred under the RTF Act.
In affirming the trial court’s denial of summary judgment for the
defendant, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff was not precluded from bringing a nuisance action due to any
“ ‘changed circumstances in or about the locality’ as this phrase is
154
intended by the statute.” Noting that “[t]his is not a case in which
the non-agricultural use extended into an agricultural area,” the court
implicitly rejected the view that the one-year requirement within the
statute should be read as a statute of repose defining a limited time
155
period in which a nuisance suit may be brought. Consistent with the
156
the court
interpretation of similar RTF statutes in other states,
interpreted the statute to condition the affirmative defense on a
finding that the defendant’s operation preceded the plaintiff’s non157
agricultural use.
Similarly, agricultural operations that underwent a “fundamental
158
change” received only limited protections under the 1979 law. In
159
Durham v. Britt,
a residential developer purchased property

152. See id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (noting the defendant purchased his property
fifteen years prior to the commencement of the action and began raising hogs there);
Statement of the Evidence at 27, Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985)
(No. 8429SC1230) (noting the defendant operated a hog farm for at least ten years) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
153. Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490.
154. Id. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (1983)).
155. Id. In Mayes, the defendant was operating a hog farm for well over one year
prior to the commencement of the nuisance action. See id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (noting
the defendant purchased his property fifteen years prior to the commencement of the
action and began raising hogs there); Statement of the Evidence at 27, Mayes v. Tabor, 77
N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985) (No. 8429SC1230) (noting the defendant operated a
hog farm for at least ten years).
156. See Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 579 (Ga. 1981); Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d
1352, 1355 (Idaho 1995); Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990). But see Steffens v. Keeler, 503 N.W.2d 675, 677–78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that even though plaintiff first inhabited neighboring property, the defendant’s hog farm
not subject to private nuisance suit because the farm was operated in conformity with
generally accepted agricultural practices, and the use of area within one mile radius of
defendant’s property had not sufficiently changed before defendants started hog
operation); Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37–38 (Tex. 2003) (holding that
one-year limitation in Texas RTF law represented a statute of repose, providing absolute
immunity to a non-negligent agricultural operation that had been in operation for over a
year).
157. Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (“This is not a case in which the
non-agricultural use extended into an agricultural area. Camp Deerwoode has been in
existence for sixty years.”).
158. Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 254–55, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3–4 (1994).
159. 117 N.C. App. 250, 451 S.E.2d 1 (1994).
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located next to an existing turkey farm that had operated for several
160
years.
Following the plaintiff’s purchase of the property, the
neighboring farm owner sought to convert his operation into an
161
The plaintiff brought a nuisance action
industrial hog facility.
against the property owner prior to the commencement of the hog
farming operation and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on the basis that the nuisance claim is barred
162
under the RTF law.
In reversing the trial court, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
stated “we do not believe the legislature intended [the North Carolina
RTF statute] to cover situations in which a party fundamentally
changes the nature of the agricultural activity which had theretofore
163
been covered under the statute.” While noting that “a fundamental
change could consist of a significant change in the type of agricultural
operation, or a significant change in the hours of the agricultural
164
operation,” the court held that “[c]ertainly, in the instant case, a
fundamental change has occurred where defendant, who previously
operated turkey houses, has decided to change his farming operation
165
to that of a hog production facility.” The Durham court reasoned
that the “plaintiff did not ‘come to the nuisance,’ but rather,
defendant Britt ‘imposed the nuisance upon plaintiff’ because ‘no
nuisance existed until defendant Britt fundamentally changed the
nature of the agricultural activity occurring on his property by
166
constructing a high volume commercial swine facility.’ ”
Contrasting the operation of “turkey houses” with that of a “hog
production facility,” the Durham court drew a distinction between the

160. Id. at 251, 451 S.E.2d at 1. The defendant operated four turkey houses at the
time of the trial. Id.
161. Id. at 251, 451 S.E.2d at 1–2.
162. Id. at 252–53, 451 S.E.2d at 2.
163. Id. at 254–55, 451 S.E.2d at 3 (emphasis added).
164. Id. (emphasis added) (citing IND. CODE. § 34-1-52-4 (1986)) (comparing the
North Carolina RTF statute to Indiana RTF statute).
165. Id. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 4. While not expressly clarified by the Durham court,
the finding of a “fundamental change” would most likely result in the resetting of the oneyear statute of repose within the statute. See Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d
100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting a similar Indiana RTF statute and explaining
the effect of finding of a significant change).
166. Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3 (emphasis added) (quoting
plaintiff’s brief). The alternative, as alluded to in the opinion, would be that after
“conduct[ing] an agricultural operation on his property for a period in excess of one year,
thereafter [a person] may conduct any agricultural activity regardless of its scope and
impact on surrounding neighbors, and the neighbors may not be heard to complain.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting plaintiff’s brief).
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167

two types of farming operations. In this sense, the court’s exclusive
use of the phrase “hog production facility” rather than “hog farm” is
revealing because it distinguishes traditional farming practices from
168
those of industrial agriculture.
The limitations imposed by the
North Carolina Court of Appeals advanced the argument that such
169
facilities should not receive the same protection under the statute.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina declined to hear the appeal of
170
the reversal. North Carolina’s treatment of such cases is consistent
with other state courts, which have similarly found that a significant
change in operation precludes the availability of an affirmative
171
defense when interpreting comparable RTF laws.
In many ways, this interpretation of the statute resembles the
balancing of equitable considerations in common law, helping to
ensure that the application of nuisance immunity under the law does
172
not overstep its intended purpose. However, the 2013 amendments
to the RTF law severely curtail the prior statutory interpretation by
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, raising serious doubts about
the equitable relief available to plaintiffs under these circumstances.

167. Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3; see Burns, supra note 41, at 881
n.241.
168. Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3–4; see Burns, supra note 41, at
881 n.241 (noting the court’s use of the term “hog production facility” in its opinion).
169. See Burns, supra note 41, at 881.
170. Durham v. Britt, 340 N.C. 260, 456 S.E.2d 828 (1995).
171. See Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Idaho 1995) (“The district court
correctly concluded the RTFA does not wholly prevent a finding of nuisance in
circumstances of an expanding agricultural operation surrounded by an area that has
remained substantially unchanged.”); Jerome Twp. v. Melchi, 457 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a change from a strawberry farm to an apiary precluded a
nuisance defense under the Michigan RTF act). In Payne v. Skaar, the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed the district court’s holding that the expansion of a feedlot from
approximately 1,000–2,500 head of cattle to 3,200–4,900 head of cattle constituted a
significant change that precluded a defense under the RTF statute. Payne, 900 P.2d. at
1353–54. The court emphasized the fact that the surrounding area remained substantially
unchanged and some of the citizens involved in the suit predated the feedlot. Id. at 1355.
On the other hand, some courts have held that an expansion or change in operation does
not render the RTF act inapplicable. But see Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d
100, 102–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a change from grain farming to hog farming
constituted a significant change, but an expansion of the hog facility from 29 hogs to
between 200–300 hogs did not preclude a nuisance defense under the Indiana RTF law);
Steffens v. Keeler, 503 N.W.2d 675, 677–78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that pig farm
could raise an affirmative defense under the Michigan RTF Act even when it did not
precede the plaintiff landowner because there was insufficient evidence that the area
surrounding the farm had changed to a predominantly residential area).
172. See Zboreak, supra note 36, at 170.
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III. ENACTMENT AND POTENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 2013
AMENDMENTS TO THE NORTH CAROLINA RTF ACT
Over fifteen years after Durham v. Britt, the North Carolina
General Assembly significantly amended the RTF law to expand the
scope of statutory protections afforded to agricultural and forestry
173
operations from nuisance suits. The passage of this legislation is
better understood if viewed in conjunction with growing number of
agricultural nuisance suits being filed in North Carolina and several
174
other states.
As of this writing, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has not yet had the opportunity to interpret the RTF law as
amended. This Section will explore the underlying motivations behind
the law—as well as potential statutory interpretations of the amended
RTF law—by drawing from the interpretations of similar provisions
in other states.
A. Growing Trend in Agricultural Nuisance Suits and Legislative
Proposals
Despite the statutory protections from nuisance suits afforded to
agricultural operations under RTF laws across the country, plaintiffs
have brought successful nuisance actions against industrial
175
agricultural facilities.
Neighboring landowners have successfully
halted the construction of industrial hog farms by obtaining
176
Plaintiffs
injunctions under the theory of anticipatory nuisance.
have also won multiple high-profile nuisance lawsuits against
177
industrial pork producers for the operation of existing facilities. In
173. See infra Section III.B.
174. See infra Section III.A.
175. See, e.g., Fatka, supra note 142 (noting recent nuisance suit in Indiana as well as
other pending cases in California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania); Bridget Huber, Law and
Odor: How to Take Down a Terrible-Smelling Hog Farm, MOTHER JONES (May 21, 2014
5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/04/terrible-smell-hog-farmslawsuits [https://perma.cc/K3P5-338X].
176. See Superior Farm Mgmt. v. Montgomery, 513 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. 1999);
Terence J. Centner, Agricultural Nuisances: Qualifying Legislative ‘‘Right-to-Farm’’
Protection Through Qualifying Management Practices, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 259, 261
(2002).
177. See, e.g., Hanes v. Cont’l Grain Co., 58 S.W.3d 1, 2, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff’s temporary nuisance claim against hog
producer and award of $100,000 to fifty-two of the plaintiffs); Huber, supra note 175
(noting the success of two plaintiff’s lawyers in securing over $32 million in jury verdicts as
well as millions of dollars in settlements for nuisance suits brought against hog producers);
Mark Koba, $20 Million Fight Threatened Over Pig Smell on Farm, NBC NEWS (May 9,
2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/20-million-fight-threatened
-over-pig-smell-farm-n101751 [https://perma.cc/WJ2W-8AHA] (noting that a $20 million
lawsuit is threatened against pork producer).

94 N.C. L. REV. 2097 (2016)

2016]

RIGHT TO FARM AND NUISANCE LAW

2125

2010, a jury awarded seven Missouri plaintiffs an $11 million
judgment in a nuisance suit against Premium Standard Farms, Inc., a
178
subsidiary of Smithfield Foods.
After the jury verdict was
179
announced, Premium Standard Farms threatened to leave the state.
In 2013, hundreds of plaintiffs brought nuisance claims against
hog producer Murphy-Brown, LLC, a subsidiary of Smithfield
180
Foods, arising from Murphy-Brown’s operation of industrial hog
181
facilities in North Carolina. As of this writing, there are currently
twenty-six lawsuits related to these nuisance actions pending in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
182
Carolina.
According to the complaints, many plaintiffs are
183
longtime—if not lifelong—area residents, some of whom can trace
back their family’s ownership of their current properties over a
184
century or more. The complaints illustrate the plight of residents
living near these facilities:
Plaintiffs have suffered episodes of noxious and sickening odor,
onslaughts of flies and pests, nausea, burning and watery eyes,
178. Owens v. ContiGroup Cos., 344 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Mont. Ct. App. 2011)
(affirming verdict and rejecting defendant’s claim that damages were excessive). See Ryan
Davis, Mo. Looks to Rein in Farm Odor Nuisance Suits, LAW360, (Mar. 31, 2011, 8:06 PM)
http://www.law360.com/articles/229224/mo-looks-to-rein-in-farm-odor-nuisance-suits [https://
perma.cc/GW3U-AXQK].
179. Following the jury verdict, Premium Standard Farms issued a press release
stating that “[i]n light of this decision and in view of the continuing hostile environment
toward live hog production, we have serious concerns whether we will ever make any
future investments in the state of Missouri.” Press Release, Premium Standard Farms,
LLC, Premium Standard Farms to Appeal Missouri Verdict, BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 4,
2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100304006726/en/Premium-StandardFarms-Appeal-Missouri-Verdict#.Uz78XmTrVkC [https://perma.cc/6WN7-KUNU]; see
Davis, supra note 178.
180. See Michaels, supra note 27; NC Hog Farm Factory Litigation, WALLACE &
GRAHAM, P.A., http://myhogfarmcase.com/ [https://perma.cc/6Y74-8AX3]. While
nuisance claims were initially filed back in July of 2013, those claims were withdrawn and
new claims were filed in 2014 under the direction of the law firm Wallace & Graham. See
supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 26–32 and accompanying text.
182. NC Hog Farm Factory Litigation, supra note 180.
183. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 7, 10, 12, 14, 17, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC,
No. 7:14-CV-00185-BR, (E.D.N.C. July 31, 2015) ECF No. 42 (noting plaintiff
Annjeanette Gillis was a lifelong resident; plaintiff Gwendolyn Pickett was a lifelong
resident; plaintiff Allen T. Johnson has lived there his whole life except for two years;
plaintiff Elsie Darlene Maynor was a lifelong resident of the community, who has resided
at her current residence for twenty-three years; and plaintiff William Murphy and his
family have lived at their current residence for many years).
184. See, e.g., id. at 7. One of the plaintiffs, Annjeanette Gillis, is an African
American woman who has lived on her family’s homestead since she was born in 1949. Id.
The complaint notes that her family’s claim to the land dates back over a century to the
Reconstruction era. Id.
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stress, anger, worry, loss of property value, loss of use and
enjoyment of their property, inability to comfortably engage in
outdoor activities, cookouts, gardening, lawn chores, drifting of
odorous mist and spray onto their land, inability to keep
windows and doors open, difficulty breathing and numerous
185
other harms.
186

The plaintiffs alleged private temporary nuisance and negligence
187
188
claims, requesting both compensatory and punitive damages. The
defendant, Murphy-Brown, LLC, raised the affirmative defense that
the plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the RTF law.
In support of its defense, Murphy-Brown alleged that “the farm[s] at
issue began operations more than one year before Plaintiffs’ alleged
causes of action arose and that operations at that farm were
189
reasonable and not a nuisance at the time they began.”
This
ongoing nuisance litigation served as a catalyst for the 2013
190
amendments to the North Carolina RTF law.
In response to the increasing number of agricultural nuisance
lawsuits over the past two decades, many states, including North
Carolina, have expanded protections for agricultural facilities from
191
nuisance actions.
Following the $11 million jury verdict for the
plaintiffs in the case against Premium Standard Farms, the Missouri
legislature passed a law prohibiting multiple lawsuits against the same
farm under the theory of temporary nuisance and limiting the
availability of damages in both temporary and permanent nuisance

185. Id. at 6.
186. Id. at 58–60. The Plaintiffs claim that their “right to use and enjoy their
properties has been impaired by recurring foul and offensive odors; hog manure and urine;
flies or other insects; buzzards or other scavenger animals; vectors of disease; trucks cause
noise and lights at night and foul smells; dead hogs; and other sources of nuisance.” Id. at
58. The complaint alleges that “[t]he nuisance caused by Defendant’s swine has
substantially impaired Plaintiffs’ and [sic] use and enjoyment of their property, and has
caused anger, embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, inconvenience, decreased quality of
life, deprivation of opportunity to continue to develop properties, injury to and diminished
value of properties, physical and mental discomfort and reasonable fear of disease and
adverse health effects.” Id.
187. Id. at 60–61.
188. Id. at 62. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant is vicariously liable for the
actions of its contract growers in the state, and otherwise liable under an “integrator
liability” theory. Id. at 50.
189. Defendant’s Answer at 51, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-CV-00185BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF No. 43.
190. See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
191. See Bennett, supra note 14.
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192

actions. Other states have even amended their state constitutions to
193
incorporate a constitutional “right to farm.”
In addition, many states have strengthened protections for
194
agricultural facilities through amendments to their RTF laws. In
recognition of this trend, the American Legislative Exchange Council
(“ALEC”), a conservative think tank, released its own model Right195
to-Farm Act in 1996. ALEC’s model RTF law provides extensive
196
The
protections for agricultural operations from nuisance suits.
model bill broadly defines “agricultural operations” and significantly
limits the circumstances under which changes at an agricultural
197
facility would expose it to nuisance liability. In addition, the model

192. Brent Martin, Gov. Nixon Signs Farm Nuisance Lawsuit Bill, After Vetoing
Initial Bill, MISSOURINET (May 11, 2011), http://www.missourinet.com/2011/05/11/govnixon-signs-farm-nuisance-lawsuit-bill-after-vetoing-initial-bill-audio/ [https://perma.cc
/8WGV-8WDW]; Missouri Jury Awards Residents $11 Million in Damages from Living
Under Cloud of Stench Caused by Industrial Hog Farms, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 5, 2010,
1:58 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/missouri-jury-awards-residents-11million-in-damages-from-living-under-cloud-of-stench-caused-by-industrial-hog-farms86643287.html [https://perma.cc/QP8Y-KNPZ]; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.296 (2015).
193. North Dakota and Missouri have both amended their state constitutions to
include a right-to-farm, while Oklahoma and Indiana have unsuccessfully attempted to do
so. See Ross H. Pifer, Right to Farm Statutes and the Changing State of Modern
Agriculture, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707, 715–717 (discussing North Dakota
Constitutional Amendment); Zboreak, supra note 36, at n.173 (discussing North Dakota
and Missouri amendments and attempted constitutional amendment in Indiana); Brook
Jarvis, A Constitutional Right to Industrial Farming?, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-09/industrial-farming-state-constitutionalamendments-may-give-legal-shield [https://perma.cc/Z8UK-5UL7]. In 2012, North Dakota
amended its constitution to provide constitutional protections for “the right of farmers and
ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern livestock production, and ranching
practices.” N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29 (amended 2012). In 2014, Missouri successfully
amended its constitution to incorporate a “right of farmers and ranchers to engage in
farming and ranching practices[.]” MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (amended 2014). These
amendments have been sharply criticized as “a concerted effort to shield factory farms and
concentrated agricultural feeding operations from regulations to protect livestock,
consumers and the environment.” Vote ‘no’ on Missouri ‘Right to Farm’ Amendment in
August, KANSAS CITY STAR (June 23 2014 4:43 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/
editorials/article603633.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/K9PU-HHYV].
194. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78 (describing the extension of “right to
farm” protection to facilities that met regulatory requirements); David Bennett, supra
note 14 (explaining how several states have passed legislation to protect “modern farming
rights”).
195. Right to Farm Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/right-to-farm-act/ [https://perma.cc/YJZ7-HCAC].
196. Id. See generally Zboreak, supra note 36, at 171–76 (discussing ALEC’s model
RTF legislation).
197. Right to Farm Act, supra note 195. In particular, the model bill states that:
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bill contains a provision that allows an agricultural operation to
recover attorneys’ fees from a plaintiff following an unsuccessful
198
nuisance suit.
Several states have incorporated similar language
199
into their RTF laws.
Beginning in 1992, the North Carolina General Assembly took
additional steps to limit a plaintiff’s ability to bring a nuisance action
against a neighboring agricultural facility. The legislature first
200
extended nuisance protections to forestry operations in 1992. In
1995, North Carolina enacted legislation requiring pre-trial mediation
201
for all farm nuisance disputes. The failure of a party to engage in
mediation prior to bringing a nuisance action could result in the

A farm or farm operation is in accordance with subsection one of section two and
shall not be found to be a public or private nuisance as a result of any of the
following:
1. A change in ownership or size.
2. Temporary cessation or interruption of farming.
3. Enrollment in government programs.
4. Adoption of new technology.
5. A change in the type of farm product being produced.
Id.
198. Id. The ALEC model act provides that “[i]n any nuisance action brought in
which a farm or farm operation is alleged to be a nuisance, if the defendant farm or farm
operation prevails, the farm or farm operation may recover from the plaintiff the actual
amount of costs and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonable [sic]
incurred by the farm or farm operation in connection with the defense of the action,
together with reasonable and actual attorneys’ fees.” Id.
199. See, e.g., Act of April 13, 2005, No. 2257, sec. 5, § 2-4-107, 2005 Ark. Acts 9681,
9683–84 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE. ANN. § 2-4-107 (2015)) (incorporating
substantially similar language regarding circumstances under which farms will not be
found a nuisance); Act of June 20, 1995, No. 94, § 286.473, 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts. 1065,
1066–68 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 286.473 (2015))(using almost
verbatim language regarding circumstances under which farms will not be found a
nuisance and attorney fees); Act of May 11, 2009, ch. 147, sec. 1, 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws
508, 509 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1.1 (2015))(inserted fee-shifting
provision and statute of repose).
200. Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, § 106-700, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 441, 441–43
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015)).
201. Act of July 27, 1995, ch. 500, sec. 1, § 7A-38.3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1489, 1492–
94 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.3 (2015)). See Powell v. Bulluck, 155
N.C. App. 613, 615–17, 573 S.E.2d 699, 701–02 (2002) (discussing the statutory
requirements and clarifying that “[t]he statute does not require that all interested parties,
who may later become plaintiffs, join in the request for mediation”). The stated purpose of
requiring mediated settlement conferences is “to facilitate the settlement of superior court
civil actions and to make civil litigation more economical, efficient, and satisfactory to
litigants and the State.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (2015). Note that the 2013 amendment
further amended the tolling provision of the statute to provide that “[t]he filing of a
request for prelitigation mediation under subsection (d) of this section does not constitute
the commencement or the bringing of an action involving a farm nuisance dispute.” N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.3(h) (2015).
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202

dismissal of the case.
The protections afforded to agricultural
facilities were substantially broadened following the 2013
amendments to the RTF law.
B.

The 2013 Amendments to the North Carolina RTF Law

On July 17, 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly
amended the state’s RTF law to further limit the remedies available
to neighboring landowners in agricultural nuisance actions, extending
protections to agricultural and forestry operations well beyond the
203
scope of the original law.
The amendments closely resembled
204
language contained in the model bill proposed by ALEC, as well as
205
The North Carolina
the amended RTF statute in Indiana.
legislature amended the RTF law only weeks after plaintiffs filed
hundreds of nuisance suits against Murphy-Brown arising from its
206
operation of industrial hog facilities.
A comparison of the
legislative history and the timeline of the litigation strongly suggests
that the proposed amendments were modified to apply to the
207
developing litigation.
After Governor McCrory signed the
amendments into law on July 18, 2013, the law went into effect
202. § 7A-38.3(c) (potentially serving as a barrier to plaintiffs in agricultural nuisance
suits).
203. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2015)). The Act was entitled “An Act
to Provide that Agricultural and Forestry Operations Are Not Nuisances Under Certain
Circumstances and to Provide for the Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees.” Id.
204. See Right to Farm Act, supra note 195; Zboreak, supra note 36, at 175
(discussing the fee-shifting provision in the ALEC model RTF).
205. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9.5 (West 2015).
206. See Michaels, supra note 27 (noting the Wake County court received close to
600 complaints during the first week of July).
207. On July 3, 2013, the plaintiffs involved in the nuisance litigation began to file
and serve prelitigation farm nuisance mediation demands. See, e.g., Request for
Prelitigation Mediation of Farm Nuisance Dispute, No. 13-R-685 Blanks v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. July 3, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
On July 17, 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a significantly amended
version of the bill. See H.R. 614, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (Proposed
Conference Comm. Substitute H614-PCCS80415-TQ-3, July 16, 2013). This final version
of the bill, as enacted, incorporated a new section to stating that “[t]he filing of a request
for prelitigation mediation under subsection (d) of this section does not constitute the
commencement or the bringing of an action involving a farm nuisance dispute.” Act of
July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 2, § 7A-38.3(h) 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 859 (codified as
amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.3(h) (2015)) Prior versions of the amendment
provided that the bill would become effective on October 1, 2013. See, e.g., H.R. 614, 2013
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as adopted in S. Comm. on Agric., Env’t, & Nat.
Res, June 11, 2013). However, the final version was altered to state that “[t]his act is
effective when it becomes law and applies to actions commenced or brought on or after
that date.” Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 3, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 859.
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immediately, applying to all actions commenced on or after that
208
date.
The amended RTF law imposes substantial limitations on the
equitable relief available to plaintiffs in agricultural nuisance suits. In
contrast to the holding in Durham v. Britt, the amendment narrowly
defines what constitutes a “fundamental change” that would preclude
the defendant from raising an affirmative defense to liability under
209
the act. The amended statute provides that:
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section [providing
nuisance immunity] shall not apply when the plaintiff
demonstrates that the agricultural or forestry operation has
undergone a fundamental change. A fundamental change to the
operation does not include any of the following:
(1) A change in ownership or size.
(2) An interruption of farming for a period of no more than
three years.
(3) Participation in a government-sponsored agricultural
program.
(4) Employment of new technology.
(5) A change in the type of agricultural or forestry product
210
produced.
Even though the amended statute implicitly recognizes the limitations
211
imposed by North Carolina Court of Appeals in Durham v. Britt,
the enumerated exceptions may foreclose the possibility that any

208. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 3, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859.
209. See Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 254–55, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994) (noting
that “a fundamental change could consist of a significant change in the type of agricultural
operation, or a significant change in the hours of the agricultural operation”).
210. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701(a1), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a1) (2015)). Note that the original
version of the act sought to define these changes as “methods or practices that are
commonly or reasonably associated with agricultural or forestry production" that created
a rebuttable presumption that the agricultural or forestry operation was not a nuisance.
H.R. 614, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as referred to the House Agricultural
Committee on April 10, 2013).
211. The use of the term “fundamental change” within the amended statute strongly
suggests that the drafters intended to explicitly address the North Carolina Court of
Appeals’ holding in Durham v. Britt. See § 106-701(a1); Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254–55,
451 S.E.2d at 3 (“[W]e do not believe the legislature intended [the North Carolina RTF
statute] to cover situations in which a party fundamentally changes the nature of the
agricultural activity which had theretofore been covered under the statute.”) (emphasis
omitted). The use of the term “significant change” in similar statutes in other states
further supports this contention. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9(d)(1) (West 2015).
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agricultural facility could undergo a fundamental change within the
212
meaning of the statute.
The modifications to the subsection providing for the affirmative
213
defense under the law further reinforce this interpretation.
Whereas the prior version of the statute precluded qualifying
operations from nuisance liability due to “changed conditions in or
about the locality thereof after the same operation has been in
operation for more than one year,” the legislation modified this
provision to refer only to “changed conditions in or about the locality
outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for
214
more than a year.” Considering these modifications to the statute,
it remains unclear what, if anything, would constitute a fundamental
215
change to preclude the applicability of the nuisance defense. While
the defendant bears the initial burden of raising an affirmative
216
defense under the North Carolina RTF law, the amended statute
places a potentially high burden on the plaintiff to prove the existence
217
of a fundamental change.
Additionally, the amendment added a fee-shifting provision,
which requires the award of attorneys’ fees in a nuisance action if

212. See Zboreak, supra note 36, at 175 (noting that a reasonable interpretation of
the ALEC model bill would permit an alfalfa farmer to change his operations into a hog
farm without resetting the one-year statute of repose); infra Section III.C.
213. See Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858,
858 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (2015)). The amended version
of section (a) states: “No agricultural or forestry operation or any of its appurtenances
shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in or about the
locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for more than
one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began.” N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (2011); Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec 1, § 106701(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106701(a) (2015)) (emphasis added).
215. See infra Section III.C.
216. See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory
interpretation of the North Carolina RTF Act and burden of proof).
217. § 106-700–01(a1); see infra Section III.C (discussing the interpretation of a
similar statutory provision by the Indiana state and federal courts). The legislation also
created a separate subsection for the preexisting exception to nuisance immunity in cases
when the “nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any agricultural or
forestry operation or its appurtenances.” § 106-701(a2). As a result of this change, the
amended statute could be interpreted to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to raise
the claim of negligent or improper operation, as well. See Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509
N.E.2d 850, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the defendant had the burden of raising
the affirmative defense under the Indiana RTF statute, while plaintiff had the burden of
proof for the exception for negligent operation due to its inclusion in a “subsequent,
separate, and distinct subsection” within the statute).
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218

either party asserts a “frivolous or malicious” claim. As originally
proposed, the amendment would have awarded attorneys’ fees to any
219
prevailing defendant in any agricultural nuisance claim. However,
the final language represents a compromise position, allowing each
party to recover attorneys’ fees only in cases where the other is found
220
to have asserted a “frivolous or malicious” claim. Considering the
limited scope of the provision to “frivolous or malicious” claims, it
remains to be seen whether the fee-shifting provision will serve as a
221
significant barrier to potential litigants.
Finally, the amendment expanded the definition of forestry
222
operations to cover “sawmill operations.”
This change is
particularly significant considering the recent growth of the wood
223
pellet industry in North Carolina. The expanded definition makes it

218. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701(f), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700–01(f) (2015)). The statute provides
that:
In a nuisance action against an agricultural or forestry operation, the court shall
award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to:
(1) The agricultural or forestry operation when the court finds the operation was
not a nuisance and the nuisance action was frivolous or malicious; or
(2) The plaintiff when the court finds the agricultural or forestry operation was a
nuisance and the operation asserted an affirmative defense in the nuisance action
that was frivolous and malicious.
§ 106-701(f).
219. H.R. 614, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as referred to the House
Agricultural Committee on April 10, 2013) (“In any civil action in which an agricultural or
forestry operation is alleged to be a nuisance, a prevailing defendant shall recover the
aggregate amount of costs and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonably
incurred in the defense of the nuisance action, including a reasonable amount for
attorneys’ fees.”) (emphasis added). This original language closely aligned with the feeshifting provision in the model ALEC RTF law. See Right to Farm Act, supra note 195; see
also Zboreak, supra note 36, at 175–76 (discussing ALEC’s model RTF law).
220. § 106-701(f).
221. The “frivolous and malicious” language within the provision suggests that a
moving party would have to meet a significant burden in order to recover attorneys’ fees.
See id. However, the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the amended law may
still serve as a barrier for potential litigants. See Hamilton, supra note 73, at 111.
(discussing the potential impact of a similar “soft” fee-shifting provision enacted in Iowa).
222. See Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701(b1), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858,
859 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(b1) (2015)) (removing the
language “but not sawmill operations” from the definition of “forestry operations in the
existing law); id. (“For the purposes of this Article, ‘forestry operation’ shall mean those
activities involved in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees.”).
223. See Amanda Rodriguez, Monster Enviva Wood Pellet Plants Invade Northeast
NC Communities, DOGWOOD ALLIANCE (Mar. 12, 2014), http:// www.dogwoodalliance
.org/2014/03/monster-enviva-wood-pellet-plants-invade-northeast-nc-communities/ [https://
perma.cc/H6PJ-LLRR]; Tom Zeller Jr., Wood Pellets Are Big Business (And For Some, a
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much more likely that these facilities would be considered a “forestry
224
operation” covered under the RTF law. The size and scale of these
225
facilities illustrates the rationale for expressly excluding “sawmill
226
operation[s]” in the original amendment to the RTF law in 1992.
These industrial wood pellet facilities operate twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week, creating significant amounts of noise, light,
and dust as well as increased traffic within the surrounding
227
community. Prior to the 2013 amendment, the operation of the two
228
existing facilities had incited protests from neighboring residents.
Under the amended RTF law, some of these facilities may be able to
raise an affirmative defense against claims brought by residents of the
229
community that preceded the facility. Similar to the operation of
CAFOs within the state, the nature of these facilities and their impact
Big Worry), FORBES (Feb. 1, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomzeller
/2015/02/01/wood-pellets-are-big-business-and-for-some-a-big-worry/ [https://perma.cc/6HPJPMR2]. The development of this industry has been driven largely by the soaring demand
for wood pellets in Europe associated with government policies to encourage renewable
fuel sources. See Zeller, supra.
224. See § 106-701(b1) (defining “forestry operation[s]” as “those activities involved
in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees”).
225. The wood pellet manufacturer, Enviva is currently operating two wood pellet
facilities in the state with a combined capacity to produce approximately 880 metric tons,
or 1.9 billion pounds, of wood pellets per year. See Enviva Pellets Northampton, ENVIVA,
http://www.envivabiomass.com/manufacturing-operations/northampton/ [https://perma.cc
/B66P-S65X] (noting the facility has a total production capacity of 510,000 metric tons per
year); Enviva Pellets Ahoskie, ENVIVA, http://www.envivabiomass.com/manufacturingoperations/ahoskie/ [https://perma.cc/879S-62B7] (“Enviva Pellets Ahoskie has a
production capacity of approximately 370K metric tons and operates 24 hours a day, seven
days a week.”). In addition, Enviva is in the process of constructing two new facilities in
North Carolina that will effectively double its production capacity. See Chick Jacobs,
Work Begins on Wood Pellet Plant in Sampson County, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Feb.
22, 2015), http://www.fayobserver.com/news/local/work-begins-on-wood-pellet-plant-insampson-county/article_0114d6a2-0746-55e4-b800-1c024fd5ec8f.html [https://perma.cc
/URU6-9BNA] (reporting that the wood pellet plant in Sampson County is under
construction and that construction will begin on another plant in Richmond County once
it is completed); Enviva Pellets Sampson, LLC, ENVIVA, http://www.envivabiomass.com
/enviva-pellets-sampson-llc/ [https://perma.cc/6YCC-9WDJ] (noting production capacity
of 500,000 metric tons per year).
226. See Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, § 106-701(b1), 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 441,
441 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(b1) (2015)).
227. See Rodriguez, supra note 223 (“Residents close to the plant have faced 24/7
extreme noise levels and bright lights. They’ve lived with sticky wood dust that coats cars,
buildings and lungs in just a few minutes, as well as dangerous, heavy truck traffic.”);
Enviva Pellets Ahoskie, supra note 225 (“Enviva Pellets Ahoskie has a production capacity
of approximately 370K metric tons and operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”).
228. See Rodriguez, supra note 223.
229. For example, the Enviva facility in Ahoskie may be able to raise this defense as
it was built on the site of a former Georgia-Pacific sawmill. Enviva Pellets Ahoskie, supra
note 225.

94 N.C. L. REV. 2097 (2016)

2134

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

on surrounding communities do not fit squarely within the proposed
justification of the law to “reduce the loss to the State of its
230
agricultural and forestry resources[.]”
C.

The Example of Indiana: An Argument for a Broad Interpretation
of the Amended North Carolina RTF Act

While North Carolina’s amended RTF law has yet been subject
to judicial review as of this writing, the passage and interpretation of
Indiana’s RTF law may provide guidance about the potential
implications for agricultural nuisance suits in North Carolina. While
231
other states have made similar reforms to their RTF acts,
the
Indiana RTF statute perhaps most closely resembles the amended
232
North Carolina law. In 2005, Indiana amended its RTF law to add
similar limitations on what would constitute a significant change in
operation for a facility to lose its nuisance immunity under the RTF
233
law. In addition, Indiana further amended its RTF statute in 2012
234
to provide a similar fee-shifting provision. Prior to the passage of
the 2013 amendments to the RTF law in North Carolina, the Indiana
state courts, as well as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
interpreted the amended Indiana RTF statute favorably for
235
agricultural interests.
Before Indiana amended its RTF law in 2005, the law expressly
limited nuisance protections for agricultural operations in cases where
236
there was a “significant change in the type of operation.” Similar to
the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Durham v. Britt, the Indiana
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2015). These facilities provide substantial economic
benefits to the region. See Zeller, supra note 223; Jacobs, supra note 225 (noting the two
new Enviva wood pellet facilities are projected to provide 160 permanent jobs). On the
other hand, many environmental groups question whether this extractive industry
provides a sustainable development model for the region. See Zeller, supra note 223.
231. See, e.g., Act of April 13, 2005, No. 2257, sec. 5, § 2-4-107, 2005 Ark. Acts 9681,
9683–84 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE. ANN. § 2-4-107 (2015)); Act of June 20,
1995, No. 94, § 286.473, 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts. 1065, 1066–68 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 286.473 (2015)).
232. Note, however, the Indiana RTF law does not exclude a finding of significant
change due to an interruption in the operation of a facility like the amended North
Carolina law. Compare IND. CODE § 32-30-6-9(d)(1) (2015), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106701(a1)(2) (2015).
233. Act of Apr. 14, 2005, Pub. L. No. 23, sec. 1, § 32-30-6-9(d), 2005 Ind. Acts 1389,
1389–90 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 32-30-6-9.5 (2015)).
234. Act of Mar. 15, 2012, Pub. L. No. 73, sec. 1, 2012 Ind. Acts 1047, 1047 (codified
as amended at IND. CODE § 32-30-6-9.5 (2015)).
235. See Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC, 517 F. App'x 518, 519 (7th Cir.
2013); Parker v. Obert’s Legacy Dairy, LLC, 988 N.E.2d 319, 324–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
236. IND. CODE § 32-30-6-9 (2004).
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Court of Appeals interpreted the prior version of the Indiana statute
to preclude a defendant from raising an affirmative defense in cases
“where there has been either a significant change in the hours of
237
operation or a significant change in the type of operation.”
However, the 2005 amendment modified the statute to provide that:
(1) A significant change in the type of agricultural operation
does not include the following:
(A) The conversion from one type of agricultural operation
to another type of agricultural operation.
(B) A change in the ownership or size of the agricultural
operation.
(C) The (i) enrollment or (ii) reduction or cessation of
participation of the agricultural operation in a
government program.
(D) Adoption of new technology by the agricultural
operation.
(2) The operation would not have been a nuisance at the time
238
the agricultural or industrial operation began on that locality.
In cases applying the amended statute, Indiana and federal courts
have uniformly held that a significant change does not occur where
the agricultural operation changes from one type of agricultural
239
product to another.
240
In Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this

237. Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Similar
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Durham v. Britt, the Indiana Court of Appeals
in Laux held that the change from the cultivation of grain to hog farm constituted a
significant change under the statute. Id. at 103; see Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250,
255, 451 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994). However, the court held that the expansion of the hog facility
did not constitute a significant change under the statute. Laux, 550 N.E.2d at 103.
238. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9(d) (West 2015).
239. See, e.g., Dalzell, 517 F. App'x at 519 (affirming the district court’s statutory
interpretation of the act); Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1567WTL-MJD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773, at *13 n.9 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2012) (“Thus
while the change from a crop farm to a pig farm was a ‘significant change’ under the Act as
it existed in Laux, it is not today.”); Parker, 988 N.E.2d at 324–25 (affirming summary
judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the conversion of crop land to a dairy
farm did not constitute a significant change). In Parker, the Indiana Court of Appeals
rejected the plaintiff’s contention that “the legislature could not have intended the Act to
apply to long-time residents whose daily, rural life suffers at the hands of a “factory-like
‘mega-farm.’ ” Parker, 988 N.E.2d at 324. The court noted that “it is clear that the Act
insulates the [defendant’s] expansion of their dairy farm from nuisance suits under these
circumstances.” Id. at 325.
240. 517 F. App'x 518 (7th Cir. 2013).
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241

interpretation of the amended statute. In that case, the defendant
242
purchased a farm that had been used to plant beans and corn. After
growing crops on the property for one year, the defendant converted
243
the property into an industrial hog farm that housed 2,800 swine.
The neighboring property owners who had lived there prior to the
244
defendant brought a nuisance suit against the farm. Affirming the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for the agricultural
245
producer,
the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments that the RTF act should not be applicable because they did
246
not “come to the nuisance.” In support of its holding, the court
noted that the land in question had been in agricultural use since
1956, and affirmed that a change in the type of agricultural operation
does not constitute a significant change under the amended RTF
247
statute.
The Seventh Circuit in Dalzell also adopted a strict
interpretation of the statutory exemption for the affirmative defense
248
in cases of negligent operation. In spite of substantial evidence that
the defendant operated several aspects of the farm negligently, the
court affirmed the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the negligent operation was the proximate cause of
249
the alleged nuisance. The district court noted ten separate instances
in which the farm in question had been operated in a negligent
manner, including several instances of poor husbandry and odor
control practices, land application of manure directly adjacent to
neighboring property lines, and negligent management of the
250
“mortality composter.” Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the nuisance “result[ed] from”

241. Id. at 519.
242. Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773, at *3.
243. Id. at *3.
244. Id.
245. Id. at *14–15, *21–23.
246. Dalzell, 517 F. App'x at 519.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 520. The relevant provision of the Indiana RTF law states: “This
section does not apply if a nuisance results from the negligent operation of an agricultural
or industrial operation or its appurtenances.” IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9(a) (West 2015).
249. Dalzell, 517 F. App’x at 520. The Seventh Circuit placed particular emphasis on
the plaintiffs’ failure to quantify the relative contribution of the odor due to the
defendant’s negligent operation of the facility. Id.
250. Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773 at *15–16.
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the negligent operation because the plaintiff failed to provide
251
sufficient evidence linking the odor to the defendant’s negligence.
Even though the interpretation of the Indiana RTF act is not
binding authority on a North Carolina court, it does suggest that the
North Carolina RTF law provides broad protections to agricultural
and forestry facilities from nuisance liability. However, the exact
scope of these protections deserves further attention in light of the
statutory text and existing jurisprudence in North Carolina.
D. The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of the Amended North
Carolina RTF Law
The extensive protections afforded to agricultural facilities in the
amended North Carolina RTF law favor a narrow interpretation of
the existing statute, particularly in light of the constitutional concerns
under the Fifth Amendment discussed in Part IV. The law should be
interpreted more consistently with its stated purpose to protect
252
agricultural land from encroachment by non-agricultural uses. In
light of the broad enumerated exclusions in the statute, it remains
unclear what would constitute a “fundamental change” that would
preclude a defendant from raising an affirmative defense to
253
liability. However, it is a basic tenant of statutory interpretation
that every term within a statute is presumed to have meaning and be
254
given effect. To prevent the exceptions from swallowing the rule,

251. Dalzell, 517 F. App'x at 520. The district court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that such causation should be presumed to be “within the understanding of an
ordinary layperson,” noting that “[t]he problem is that neither the Plaintiffs nor their
expert are able to say that Sky View would not be a nuisance but for the (alleged) fact that
it is negligently operated.” Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773 at *21 n.12.
252. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015) (“When other land uses extend into
agricultural and forest areas, agricultural and forestry operations often become the subject
of nuisance suits. As a result, agricultural and forestry operations are sometimes forced to
cease. Many others are discouraged from making investments in farm and forest
improvements.”).
253. See id. § 106-701(a1). The statute provides that a defendant is precluded from
raising an affirmative defense when “the plaintiff demonstrates that the agricultural or
forestry operation has undergone a fundamental change.” Id. On its face, the statute
excludes many potential changes from consideration, including a change in size or
ownership, change in the type of agricultural or forestry operation, an interruption in
operation for less than three years, and use of a new technology. Id.
254. Neil v. Kuester Real Estate Servs., Inc., 237 N.C. App. 132,146, 764 S.E.2d 498,
508 (2014) (“[W]e presume that no part of a statute is mere surplusage, but that each
provision adds something not otherwise included therein.”) (quoting Fort v. Cty. of
Cumberland, 218 N.C. App. 401, 407, 721 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2012)).
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there must be some changes in operations that would be considered a
255
“fundamental change” under the statute.
The narrow definition of “fundamental change” brings new
importance to what constitutes an agricultural or forestry operation
under the RTF statute. Agricultural and forestry operations may be
permitted to tack on consecutive prior uses and change the type of
operation or ownership without restarting the one-year statutory
256
limitation.
Considering the broad statutory definition of
257
it seems likely that many agricultural
“agricultural operation,”
258
facilities will be shielded under the Act. On the other hand, forestry
259
While
operations are defined more narrowly under the statute.
removing the sawmill exclusion in the statute does suggest that the
260
law should cover at least some sawmill operations, the statute does
261
not extend protections to all such facilities “without limitation.”
255. For example, a “significant change in the hours of the agricultural operation”
may be considered a fundamental change that does not fall under the exclusion because it
was expressly mentioned in Durham v. Britt and was not subsequently included in the
amendment. 117 N.C. App. 250, 255, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994).
256. See supra notes 213–217 and accompanying text; Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130773, at *13 n.9 (“Thus while the change from a crop farm to a pig farm was a
‘significant change’ under the Act as it existed in Laux, it is not today.”). One
interpretation of the law would permit an agricultural operation to significantly change the
scope and type of its operations, but still raise the affirmative defense under the RTF Act
if the prior operation was entitled to protections under the Act. See supra Section III.C
(discussing the interpretation of a similar RTF law in Indiana); Zboreak, supra note 36, at
175 (discussing the interpretation of a similar provision contained in ALEC’s Model RTF
law).
257. § 106-701(b) (“For the purposes of this Article, ‘agricultural operation’ includes,
without limitation, any facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops,
livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.”) (emphasis added).
258. See Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3 (“We believe the legislature
intended this statute to cover any agricultural operation, without limitation, when the
operation was initially begun.”).
259. § 106-701(b1) (“For the purposes of this Article, ‘forestry operation’ shall mean
those activities involved in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees.”)
260. See id. § 106-701(b1); Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701(b1) 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2015)).
261. Unlike the definition of agricultural operations, the RTF law does not apply to
all forestry operations “without limitation.” Compare § 106-701(b) (“For the purposes of
this Article, ‘agricultural operation’ includes, without limitation, any facility for the
production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, poultry, livestock products, or
poultry products.”) (emphasis added), with id. § 106-701(b1) (“For the purposes of this
Article, ‘forestry operation’ shall mean those activities involved in the growing, managing,
and harvesting of trees.”). Similar to the distinction drawn between an industrial hog farm
and traditional farming techniques in Durham v. Britt, the underlying rationale to protect
farmland from non-agricultural development supports a limited reading of the statute. See
supra notes 167–172 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 223–227 and
accompanying text (noting the size and scale of wood pellet facilities in operation in North
Carolina and their impact on the surrounding communities).
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Regardless, the broad statutory definitions of agricultural and forestry
operations under the RTF law could have significant implications for
neighboring landowners in agricultural nuisance suits.
Considering the phrase “changed condition” in light of the
statutory purpose and its prior interpretation by the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, the application of the RTF act should be limited to
“case[s] in which the non-agricultural use extended into an
262
agricultural area.” Absent an underlying change in the use of a
neighboring property, a defendant should not be able to raise an
affirmative defense under the RTF act simply because there was a
change in ownership. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to interpret a
statute that supposedly codifies the doctrine of “coming to the
nuisance” as allowing only one party to benefit from tacking on prior
use. Similarly, the RTF law should not apply in nuisance suits
between two agricultural facilities, as the application of nuisance
protections under these circumstances does not align with the stated
263
purpose of the RTF law.
The existing limitations on plaintiffs bringing agricultural
nuisance suits further support a narrow interpretation of the statute.
264
As seen in Dalzell v. Country View Farms, the difficulty of proving
whether a nuisance “results from” the negligent operation of a facility

262. Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985). But see
Toftoy v. Rosenwinkel, 983 N.E.2d 463, 467 (Ill. 2012) (reversing the denial of summary
judgment, holding that the plaintiffs’ acquisition of the property constituted a “changed
condition” giving rise to the application of the Illinois RTF even though the nonagricultural use predated the agricultural facility). In Mayes v. Tabor, the court placed
particular emphasis on the length of time the property had been used for non-agricultural
purposes rather than how long the property had been in possession of its present owner.
77 N.C. App. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (noting the private summer camp had been in
existence for sixty years).
263. See Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491. Other states, including
Indiana, have similarly interpreted their RTF laws to not apply in nuisance actions
between two agricultural facilities. See TDM Farms, Inc. v. Wilhoite Fam. Farm, LLC, 969
N.E.2d 97, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Stickdorn v. Zook, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 n.5 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011); see also Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. Pshp., No. CS-95-236-FVS, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at *11 (E.D. Wash. May 29, 1998) (“[The Washington RTF]
should not be read to insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance actions brought by an
agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff occupied the land before the
nuisance activity was established.” (quoting Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd., 952 P.2d
610, 616 (Wash. 1998)); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A. Feitshans, Nuisance
Revisited after Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121, 133–35 (2000)
(discussing the court’s interpretation in the Buchanan cases).
264. See Dalzell v. Country View Fam. Farms, LLC, 517 F. App’x 518, 520 (7th Cir.
2013).
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265

could limit equitable relief under the current law. In addition, a
plaintiff’s alternative means of redress are limited by strict local
266
zoning ordinances regulating agricultural facilities. North Carolina
courts have not yet addressed whether the RTF law could be applied
267
to bar certain trespass actions. Outside of the protections afforded
to agricultural facilities under the RTF statute, plaintiffs also face
both procedural and substantive barriers to bringing a cognizable
268
nuisance claim. Together, these limitations on individual property
rights may render the RTF law unconstitutional under the Takings
Clause.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH CAROLINA’S RTF ACT UNDER
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
As agricultural facilities have been granted greater protections
from nuisance suits at the expense of neighboring landowners, the
constitutionality of many RTF laws under the Takings Clause has
269
been called into question.
While constitutional challenges have
265. However, the North Carolina RTF law may arguably provide more protection
for potential plaintiffs as it applies to both “negligent” and “improper” operation of a
facility as opposed to only “negligent” operation. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a2)
(2015) (applying to both improper and negligent operation), with IND. CODE ANN. § 3230-6-9(a) (West 2015) (applying to negligent operation only).
266. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(d) (2015). In addition, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has held that the state laws regarding the siting and regulation of swine
facilities preempt any local ordinances regulating those facilities. Craig v. Cty. of Chatham,
356 N.C. 40, 50, 565 S.E.2d 172, 179 (2002); see Christy Noel, Recent Development,
Preemption Hogwash: North Carolina’s Judicial Repeal of Local Authority to Regulate
Hog Farms in Craig v. County of Chatham, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 2121, 2121–24 (2002)
(discussing implications of Craig v. County of Chatham).
267. Compare Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd., 952 P.2d 610, 618 (Wash. 1998)
(holding that right-to-farm law did not preclude trespass actions due to legislative history
and express damages savings provision within the statute), with Rancho Viejo v. Tres
Amigos Viejos, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 489–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (distinguishing the
holding in Buchanan to bar certain trespass actions on the basis that a California provision
did not contain an express damages clause).
268. From a procedural standpoint, failure to comply with the requirements for
mediated prelitigation settlement conferences prior to commencing a nuisance action may
also serve as a bar to recovery. See supra notes 202 and accompanying text. In addition,
plaintiffs may face certain hurdles in bringing a cognizable legal claim. See In re N.C.
Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83157, at *78
(E.D.N.C. June 24, 2015) (noting that it is unclear whether “annoyance and discomfort”
damages are available within the context of a temporary nuisance action in North
Carolina); Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 116–17, 574
S.E.2d 48, 53 (2002) (holding that riparian waterfront owners and river-preservation
associations failed to establish special damages in public nuisance suit against hog
producers, as aesthetic and recreational interests alone are insufficient to confer standing).
269. See, e.g., Centner, supra note 140, at 88–89; Duke & Malcolm, supra note 18, at
297–98.

94 N.C. L. REV. 2097 (2016)

2016]

RIGHT TO FARM AND NUISANCE LAW

2141

270

been raised against RTF laws across the country, as of this writing,
the Supreme Court of Iowa remains the only court to hold that an
271
RTF law effected an unconstitutional taking. In light of the broad
protections afforded to agricultural facilities, the amended North
Carolina RTF law raises significant constitutional concerns,
particularly as a regulatory taking.
A. General Overview of Takings Jurisprudence
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
272
without just compensation.” Applicable to both federal and state
273
the
governments under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but
274
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” Indeed,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the reasonable exercise of a
state’s police power permits some interference with the property
275
rights of individuals without giving rise to a compensable taking.
The Takings Clause, however, “bar[s] Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
276
should be borne by the public as a whole.” In addition to the cases
where “the government directly appropriates private property for
277
public use,” the Supreme Court has held that “if a regulation goes

270. See infra notes 300–336 and accompanying text.
271. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 173–74, 179 (Iowa 2004) (holding
nuisance-related RTF statute unconstitutional under the inalienable rights clause and
takings clause of the Iowa Constitution); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309,
321–22 (Iowa 1998) (holding a zoning-related RTF provision to be an unconstitutional
taking under both the federal and state constitution).
272. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
273. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (citing Chi., B. & Q.R.
Co. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)).
274. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)).
275. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321–22 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution contains no comparable reference to regulations
that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property.”). On the
other hand, any state action may still violate the Due Process Clause if it is found to be
“arbitrary and irrational.” E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). While the Court has
noted that a regulation with a severe retroactive application may give rise to a successful
due process challenge, the Court has generally been reluctant to invalidate economic
legislation under the Due Process Clause. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537.
276. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
277. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 324 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 522).
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278

too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Nevertheless, the proper
test to determine whether a government regulation results in a
279
compensable taking is less clear.
The United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the test to
determine whether a government regulation amounts to a taking of
280
281
private property. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Court outlined two instances in which government action amounts to
a per-se categorical taking: (1) when the government causes the
property owner to suffer a physical invasion of his or her property;
and (2) when the government regulation “denies all economically
282
beneficial or productive use of the land.” Within the context of
land-use regulations, the Court in Lucas affirmed that the Fifth
Amendment imposes limitations on the exercise of the state’s police
283
power.
Similarly, the Court has also recognized that the
government’s appropriation of an easement on private property may
give rise to a compensable taking in the context of land-use
284
permitting.
In most instances, the question of whether a government
regulation has “gone too far” requires the court to conduct an “ad
hoc, factual inquiry,” considering “the character of the action and . . .
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a

278. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 326 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922)).
279. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings
Theory, 24 PROB. & PROP. 11, 11 (2010).
280. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19.
281. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
282. Id. at 1015. See generally Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 263, at 131–32
(outlining an interpretation of the test set forth in Lucas).
283. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (holding that beachfront regulations that prevented the
plaintiff from building any habitable structure on his property constituted a categorical
taking). See id. 1022–26 (discussing the limitations on the state’s police power to enjoin
“harmful and noxious” uses of property).
284. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). Within the context of land use regulations, the Court
has also recognized the government’s right to “condition approval of a permit on the
dedication of property to the public so long as there is a nexus and rough proportionality
between the property that the government demands and the social costs of the applicant’s
proposal.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
(citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391). While the Court has extended this
taking analysis from the dedication of an easement to the extraction of monetary fees, this
constitutional analysis has not been extended beyond the context of a government
permitting process. See id. at 2599–601; Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546–
48 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan).
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286

whole.”
In Penn Central Co. v. New York City,
the Supreme
Court identified three factors to consider when determining whether
a taking has occurred: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on
the property owner; (2) the property owner’s investment backed
287
expectations; and (3) the “character of the government action.”
The Penn Central framework has no exact formula and “necessarily
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic
288
effects of government actions.”
While the North Carolina Constitution does not explicitly
prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has inferred this
right from the “law of the land” clause in Article I, Section 19 of the
289
North Carolina Constitution. North Carolina courts apply a takings
analysis similar to Penn Central to determine whether a regulation
constitutes a compensable taking under the North Carolina
290
Constitution.
Outside of the traditional exercise of eminent
domain, a compensable taking can arise from the unreasonable
291
exercise of the state’s police power or any “substantial interference
285. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 130–31 (1978)).
286. 438 U.S. 124 (1978).
287. Id.
288. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
523 (1992)).
289. Piedmont Triad Reg’l Water Auth. v. Unger, 154 N.C. App. 589, 592, 572 S.E.2d
832, 834 (2002) (quoting Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 363, 384 S.E.2d 8, 14
(1989), reh’g denied, 325 N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452–53 (1989)); see N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19
(“No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by
the law of the land.”). “A ‘taking’ has been defined as ‘entering upon private property for
more than a momentary period, and under warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it
to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a
way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.’ ” E. Appraisal Servs. v. State, 118 N.C. App. 692, 695, 457 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1995)
(quoting Stillings v. City of Winston-Salem, 311 N.C. 689, 692, 319 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1984)).
290. See Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, No. 2:11-CV-1-D, 2014 WL 4219516, at
*11 n.7 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2014) (applying the same takings analysis to assess both the
federal and state takings claims); King ex rel Warren v. State, 125 N.C. App. 379, 385, 481
S.E.2d 330, 333–34 (1997) (citing Finch, 325 N.C. at 364, 384 S.E.2d at 15; Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)) (noting the similarity between the takings
analysis set forth in the Supreme Court’s takings analysis in Lucas and that of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s in Finch) .
291. The inquiry into whether a compensable taking has occurred largely depends on
“whether a particular act is an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent
domain.” Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., __ N.C. __, __, 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (2016)
(quoting Barnes v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 257 N.C. 507, 514, 126 S.E.2d 732, 737–38
(1962)). In cases where the state is deemed to have exercised its police power, state courts
have employed an ends-means test to determine whether: (1) “the ends sought, i.e., the
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with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the
292
property.” The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized
that “[a] nuisance maintained by a governmental agency impairing
293
private property is a taking in the constitutional sense.” However,
the plaintiff must meet its burden of showing that the property value
294
has been “substantially impaired.” Within the context of land-use
regulations, courts have generally limited the finding of a
compensable regulatory taking to cases where the land owner has
been “deprived of all practical use and reasonable value of the
295
property.”
The uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of RTF laws
largely reflects the ambiguous nature of nuisance-related takings
296
cases. The maintenance of a nuisance does not fit neatly within the
297
traditional distinction between the physical invasion and regulation
298
299
in takings jurisprudence.
However, a
of someone’s property

object of the legislation, is within the escope of the [police] power”; and (2) “the means
chosen to regulate are reasonable.” Finch, 325 N.C. at 363, 384 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting
Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 261, 302 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1983)).
292. Kirby, __ N.C. __, 786 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C.
187, 198–99, 293 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1982) superseded on other grounds by Act of July 10,
1981, ch. 919, sec. 28, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1382, 1402); see id. at __, 786 S.E.2d at 924
(defining “property” as “every aspect of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as
such upon which it is practicable to place a money value” (quoting Hildebrand v. S. Bell
Tel. v. Tel. Co., 219 N.C. 402, 408, 14 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1941)).
293. Midgett v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 260 N.C. 241, 248, 132 S.E.2d 599, 606
(1963) (citing Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 674–75, 71 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1952)),
overruled on other grounds by Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 304 S.E.2d 164
(1983); see Long, 306 N.C. at 198–99, 293 S.E.2d at 109 (“Modern construction of the
‘taking’ requirement is that an actual occupation of the land, dispossession of the
landowner or even a physical touching of the land is not necessary; there need only be a
substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the
property.”).
294. Midgett, 260 N.C. at 248, 132 S.E.2d at 606 (citing McKinney v. City of High
Point, 237 N.C. 66, 76–77, 74 S.E.2d 440, 447–48 (1953)); see Long, 306 N.C. at 200, 293
S.E.2d at 110 (noting the interference must be “substantial enough to reduce the market
value of his property.”).
295. King, 125 N.C. App. 379, 386, 481 S.E.2d 330, 334 (1997). But see Kirby, __ N.C.
__, 786 S.E.2d at 925 (holding that indefinite restrictions on development placed on
properties by the North Carolina Department of Transportation within a proposed
highway development corridor constituted a compensable regulatory taking).
296. See Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86
B.U. L. REV. 819, 812–22 (2006).
297. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982) (holding the physical installation of cable equipment constituted a categorical
taking).
298. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 136–38
(1978) (holding that New York City’s landmarks law did not constitute a regulatory
taking).
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nuisance can constitute a compensable taking in certain
circumstances, particularly under the theory of inverse
300
condemnation.
301
In Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. the Supreme Court
offered some guidance as to how to interpret nuisance-related
302
cases. In Richards, the plaintiff argued that the maintenance of a
railroad track and tunnel adjacent to his property gave rise to a
303
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Court held
that “the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, [ ] do
not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial
304
a burden upon plaintiff's property without compensation to him.”
The Court noted that “sharing in the common burden of incidental
damages arising from the legalized nuisance” does not give rise to a
305
compensable taking. Thus, the Court drew a distinction between
the harm due to the noise, smoke, and vibrations equally shared
among his neighbors due to their general proximity to the railroad
tracks and singular harm to the plaintiff from the operation of a
306
fanning system in the railroad tunnel.
The Court held that a
compensable taking had occurred solely because of the “peculiar and
307
substantial” harm to the plaintiff by operation of the tunnel.

299. Ball, supra note 296, at 848–50 (comparing and contrasting nuisance-related
takings with more traditional regulatory takings).
300. Inverse condemnation represents a cause of action where the government
effects a taking of private property without providing adequate compensation. See Kirby,
__ N.C. __, 769 S.E.2d at 227. Under this theory, courts have recognized compensable
takings for nuisance-related claims. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914); Cochran v. City of Charlotte, 53
N.C. App. 390, 406, 281 S.E.2d 179, 191 (1981) (affirming holding that flights of
commercial aircraft over the plaintiffs’ property gave rise to a compensable taking);
Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 5, 1 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1939); Hines v. City of
Rocky Mt., 162 N.C. 409, 412, 78 S.E. 510, 511 (1913) (holding that the odors from a
municipal trash dump near the plaintiff’s land constituted a nuisance and a taking).
However, inverse condemnation claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51(a) (2015); see Peach v. City of High Point, 199
N.C. 359, 368, 683 S.E.2d 717, 724 (2009); infra note 337 (discussing the application of the
statute of limitations).
301. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
302. Ball, supra note 296, at 829–31.
303. Richards, 233 U.S. at 549.
304. Id. at 557.
305. Id. at 554. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262 (distinguishing the physical invasion
associated with low-altitude airplane flights over a property with the “incidental damages”
present in Richards).
306. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554.
307. Id.; see Spiek v. Mich. Dep’t of Transp., 572 N.W.2d 201, 210 (Mich. 1998)
(holding that a plaintiff must allege a harm “differs in kind” rather than by degree from
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Even though Richards remains rather dated in light of the
framework set forth in Penn Central and its subsequent cases, the
Court’s distinction between “peculiar and substantial harm” and
“incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance” provides a
308
useful starting point for assessing nuisance-related takings cases. A
review of the cases considering the constitutionality of RTF laws will
provide a better framework in which to assess the North Carolina
RTF law.
B.

Constitutionality of RTF Acts Under the Takings Clause

In interpreting RTF laws under the Takings Clause, state courts
have been divided as to whether the maintenance of an ongoing
309
nuisance rises to the level of a categorical taking.
Furthermore,
state courts have yet to explicitly assess the application of an RTF law
as a regulatory taking under the traditional Penn Central balancing
310
analysis. Accordingly, it remains unclear how a court would address
such a constitutional challenge to the North Carolina RTF law in its
current form. This divergent line of cases suggests that an analysis of
the RTF law as a regulatory taking could be the appropriate line of
inquiry in this case.

those living near a public highway to state a takings claim upon which relief could be
granted).
308. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262 (distinguishing the
physical invasion associated with low-altitude airplane flights over a property with the
“incidental damages” present in Richards); Spiek, 572 N.W.2d at 208–10 (holding that a
plaintiff must allege a harm “differs in kind” rather than by degree from those living near
a public highway to state a takings claim upon which relief could be granted) (citing
Richards, 233 U.S. at 552–54). Indeed, some have argued that this “peculiar and
substantial” burden analysis should form the basis for a new intermediate level of scrutiny
for nuisance cases, adopting a framework that falls between the finding of a categorical
taking and application of the traditional Penn Central balancing test. Ball, supra note 296,
at 850.
309. The Supreme Court of Iowa remains the only court to recognize that the
maintenance of a nuisance creates an easement that rises to the level of a physical
invasion. See Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa 2004) (holding
nuisance-related RTF statute unconstitutional under the takings clause of the Iowa
Constitution); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 322 (Iowa 1998) (holding a
zoning-related RTF provision to be an unconstitutional taking under both the federal and
state constitution). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington acknowledged in dictum
that nuisance immunity from Washington’s RTF created “a quasi easement against the
urban developments to continue those nuisance activities.” Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders
Ltd., 952 P.2d 610, 615 (Wash. 1998). At least three other state courts have rejected this
approach, based on the jurisprudence within their states. See infra notes 321–329 and
accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., supra notes 311–336 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa remains the only court to strike
311
down an RTF statute as an unconstitutional taking. In Bormann v.
312
Board of Supervisors, the Supreme Court of Iowa found a zoningrelated RTF statute unconstitutional under both the Takings Clause
313
of the Fifth Amendment and that of the Iowa Constitution. The
plaintiffs’ properties in question had been designated as “agricultural
area[s,]” as provided for in the Iowa RTF statute; this approval
cloaked agricultural facilities with immunity from nuisance suits so
314
long as their facilities operated non-negligently.
Declining to
analyze the application of the RTF act as a regulatory taking under
the Penn Central balancing test, the court held that the nontrespassory invasion associated with the dust and odor from the
agricultural facility constituted a categorical taking under both the
315
federal and state constitutions. In support of its holding, the court
recognized that the nuisance immunity provided under the RTF
statute created an easement over the adjoining property, which is a
constitutionally protected property interest under the federal and
316
Iowa state constitutions.
317
the Supreme
Furthermore, in Gacke v. Pork Extra, L.L.C.,
Court of Iowa reaffirmed the holding in Bormann, and further held a
318
nuisance-related RTF statute
to be in violation of the Takings
319
Clause and the “inalienable rights” clause of the Iowa Constitution.

311. See infra notes 312–320 and accompanying text.
312. 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
313. Id. at 321.
314. Id. at 311–12.
315. Id. at 321. “The rule finding constitutionality in close cases cannot control the
present one, however, because, with all respect, this is not a close case. When all the
varnish is removed, the challenged statutory scheme amounts to a commandeering of
valuable property rights without compensating the owners, and sacrificing those rights for
the economic advantage of a few. In short, it appropriates valuable private property
interests and awards them to strangers.” Id. at 322.
316. Id. at 316 (citing United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910)). In support of
its holding, the Bormann court cited several cases in which a non-trespassory invasion was
found to be an unconstitutional taking, analogizing the facts of the case to those in
Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co. Id. at 319 (citing Richards, 233 U.S. 546 (1914)).
317. 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004).
318. While similar to the North Carolina RTF in some respects, the statute in Gacke
differs from the amended North Carolina RTF law in that it lacks any sort of statutory
waiting period before an agricultural facility may benefit from the nuisance protections.
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (2015), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.11(2) (West
2015).
319. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 174.

94 N.C. L. REV. 2097 (2016)

2148

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

However, the Gacke court declined to address whether the statute
320
was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
Other states have declined to adopt this interpretation and have
upheld RTF laws as constitutional under the federal and state takings
clause, distinguishing Bormann’s holding that the right to maintain a
321
322
nuisance constitutes an easement.
In Lindsey v. DeGroot,
the
Indiana Court of Appeals rejected a constitutional challenge to
323
Indiana’s recently amended RTF law. The plaintiffs had purchased
a ten-acre plot of undeveloped woods and built a home in rural
324
Indiana. Three years later, the defendant converted a neighboring
325
hog operation into a large commercial dairy farm. As part of its
operation, the farm maintained large waste lagoons and began
326
spraying manure over a field adjacent to the plaintiff’s property.
Citing the Supreme Court of Iowa’s decision in Bormann, the plaintiff
alleged the act was an unconstitutional taking because it created an
327
easement over his property. In its opinion, the court distinguished
the holding in Bormann on the grounds that Indiana case law did not
328
recognize that the maintenance of a nuisance created an easement.
The Lindsey court also declined to address whether the application of
the RTF could give rise to a compensable taking under the Penn
329
Central balancing test.
While the existing case law suggests that a court is unlikely to
find that North Carolina’s amended RTF law gives rise to a
320. Id. Some commentators have suggested that this dicta on the part of the
Supreme Court of Iowa reflects that the holding in Bormann may be limited to the Iowa
Constitution and that the holding in Bormann is erroneous as it relates to the federal
Takings Clause. See Centner, supra note 140, at 119–20.
321. See Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (Idaho 2004); Barrera v.
Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. App. 2004).
322. 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
323. Id. at 1254, 1259 (affirming summary judgment for the defendant and holding
the Indiana RTF law was constitutional).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Lindsey v. DeGroot, No. 35D01-0312-PL-00262, slip op. at 3–5 (Ind. Super. Ct.
2008).
327. Lindsey, 898 N.E.2d at 1257–58 (citing Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584
N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998)).
328. Id. at 1258 (citing Barrera v. Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex.
App. 2004); Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (Idaho 2004)); see
Armstrong v. Maxwell Farms of Ind., Inc., No. 68C01-0912-CT-0539, (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 10,
2014); Jason Jordan, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor or Food on The Table: Is Texas’s Right
to Farm Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public
Policy Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 943, 968–70 (2010)
(discussing the court’s holding in Barrera).
329. See Lindsey, 898 N.E.2d at 1257–58.
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categorical taking, the amended RTF law could still be found to be
unconstitutional as a regulatory taking. Many commentators have
criticized the holding in Bormann and Gacke, arguing that
recognizing a nuisance-related easement as a categorical taking
330
establishes an overly broad interpretation of the Takings Clause.
Given the similarities of Indiana’s RTF statute to the current North
331
Carolina RTF statute, a court could be less likely to hold that the
amended RTF law constitutes a categorical taking, particularly in
332
light of the existing criticism of the Bormann and Gacke opinions.
In light of the issues raised within these divergent opinions, the
Penn Central balancing test is best suited for determining whether an
333
RTF act creates an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court’s
analysis of other land-use restrictions under the Penn Central analysis
334
provides support for this position.
As previously discussed, the
nuisance-related takings cases suggest that a plaintiff may be able to

330. See Centner, supra note 140, at 122–124 (noting that the creation of an easement
is not always considered a physical invasion). Some have noted that labeling a nuisancerelated easement as a categorical taking could have significant consequences for a wide
range of regulatory restrictions. See Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 263, 142–43
(noting that Bormann will likely remain a minority rule for these reasons); Adam Van
Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as “Takings” in light of Bormann v. Board of Supervisors
and Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 169, 191–92 (2006).
But see Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: What Do We Do with
Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 72
(2004) (“Courts and commentators are sometimes reluctant to apply regulatory takings
doctrine to the full extent recognized by the Supreme Court. The rationale is often an
abstract fear that landowners will reap unjust windfalls under the guise of ‘just
compensation.’ ”).
331. See supra notes 231–251 and accompanying text. While the Iowa RTF statute in
Gacke is similar to the North Carolina RTF law in some respects, the Iowa RTF statute
notably differs from the amended North Carolina RTF law in that it lacks any sort of
statutory waiting period before an agricultural facility may benefit from the nuisance
protections. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (2015), with IOWA CODE ANN
§ 657.11(2) (West 2015).
332. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
333. See Centner, supra note 140, at 125–26 (noting that the creation of an easement
is not always considered a physical invasion); Buskirk, supra note 318, at 192–96 (2006)
(arguing in favor of analysis of right to farm as a regulatory taking under the Penn Central
balancing test). See also Ball, supra note 296, at 854–55 (critiquing the approach taken in
Bormann as overly protective of property rights, but arguing for the application of
intermediate form of scrutiny).
334. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002) (“[L]and-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values
in some tangential way—often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per
se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could
afford.”); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1992) (analyzing rent control
ordinances in this way); Centner, supra note 140, at 129–35 (arguing in favor of such an
analysis citing Tahoe-Sierra and Yee).
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still succeed by showing “peculiar and substantial” damages. In this
sense, Penn Central inquiry provides a useful framework in which to
assess whether the harm goes beyond “incidental damages arising
336
from a legalized nuisance.” Further analysis of the North Carolina
RTF law under existing Takings Clause jurisprudence will help assess
potential outcomes under these different approaches.
C.

Analysis of North Carolina’s RTF Act under the Takings Clause

The extension of immunity to agricultural and forestry
operations under North Carolina’s RTF statute raises constitutional
concerns under the Takings Clause, particularly as a regulatory
337
taking. Under a broad reading of the statute, the law could permit
unbounded modifications in size or type of agricultural product for
338
existing agricultural or forestry facilities.
These expansive
protections run contrary to the equitable considerations inherent
339
As previously
within the “coming to the nuisance” doctrine.
discussed, there is some case law to support a finding that the
maintenance of an ongoing nuisance could give rise to a compensable
340
taking. Drawing an analogy to the award of permanent damages in
nuisance law, a court could hold that the grant of nuisance immunity

335. Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, (1914). See Moon v. N. Idaho
Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (Idaho 2004) (recognizing the plaintiffs may be entitled to
“special and peculiar” damages, but holding they failed to meet the burden of showing
such damages existed).
336. Richards, 233 U.S. at 554; cf. Ball, supra note 296, at 850 n.170 (noting the
applicability of the Penn Central inquiry to nuisance-related cases, but arguing that a
heightened form of scrutiny is needed).
337. See Centner, supra note 140, at 88–89. Under the existing statute of limitations,
landowners who have already been subjected to a nuisance from an agricultural facility for
more than two years would likely be precluded from bringing an inverse condemnation
action. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51(a) (2015); Peach v. City of High Point, 199 N.C.
App. 359, 368, 683 S.E.2d 717, 724 (2009) (“The rule is that a statute of limitations on an
inverse condemnation claim begins running when plaintiffs’ property first suffers injury.”)
(quoting Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88, 91, 497 S.E.2d 300, 302, disc.
review denied, 348 N.C. 500, 510 S.E.2d 654 (1998)).
338. See supra Section III.D.
339. See Centner, supra note 140, at 140 (“Statutes that allow major expansion or
extensive changes might produce an unconstitutional taking.”). Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of “background principles of nuisance and property law” that would justify this
type of intrusion into the property rights of neighboring landowners. See Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (holding that regulations prohibiting the
development of a beachfront property constituted a compensable taking unless the state
met its burden of identifying a background principle of state law that supported a
restriction).
340. See supra notes 292–300 and accompanying text.
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results in the creation of a constitutionally protected easement.
However, considering the relevant case law regarding the
constitutionality of RTF laws, it is doubtful that a court would hold
that the nuisance immunity provided under the RTF law would give
rise to a categorical taking under either the Fifth Amendment or the
342
North Carolina Constitution.
While often overlooked in the federal and state takings
343
jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of RTF statutes, the
North Carolina RTF law could also be found unconstitutional as a
344
regulatory taking under the traditional Penn Central balancing test.
The expansive immunity provided under the North Carolina RTF law
raises legitimate questions about whether the law’s application is
“forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
345
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
Applying the factors identified in Penn Central, an agricultural
facility that undergoes a significant change in operation presents a
strong argument in favor of finding an unconstitutional taking. For
example, a neighboring farm that converts from a soybean farming
operation to an industrial hog facility could raise significant concerns
under the traditional Penn Central inquiry, assuming the defendant

341. See Brown v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 162 N.C. 83, 87, 77 S.E. 1102, 1104
(1913) (noting that in a nuisance action for permanent damages, “the suit then amounts to
the partial taking of another’s property, and it becomes in effect a proceeding to condemn
on the complainant’s land an easement to operate the plant for all time in the specified
way . . . .”); Broadbent v. Allison, 176 N.C. App. 359, 363, 626 S.E.2d 758, 762 (2006)
((“When permanent damages are at issue in a nuisance trial, and that nuisance ‘operates
as a partial taking of the plaintiff's property, any resulting benefit peculiar to him may be
considered in mitigation of damages.’ ”) (quoting Brown, 162 N.C. at 87, 77 S.E. at 1104)).
342. There remains a credible argument that the “nexus”/“rough proportionality”
test that the Supreme Court has applied in the context of government permitting decisions
may be applicable here. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2600 (2013). However, in contrast to a permit requirement or fee, the creation of a
nuisance poses a much more indirect imposition of liability. For this reason, it seems
unlikely that this precedent would be extended to cover such cases. See id. at 2599–600
(emphasizing demand for monetary payment).
343. See Centner, supra note 140, at 129–35 (arguing in favor of the application of
the Penn Central inquiry).
344. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334
(2002) (noting that “if petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to their
individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of them might have
prevailed under a Penn Central analysis”). Alternatively, a plaintiff may be able to succeed
by showing the incurrence of “peculiar and substantial” damages. Richards v. Wash.
Terminal Co. 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914); see Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 96 P.3d 637,
645 (Idaho 2004) (recognizing the plaintiffs may be entitled to “special and peculiar”
damages, but holding they failed to meet the burden of showing such damages existed).
345. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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could successfully raise an affirmative defense under the RTF law.
First and foremost, the imposition of nuisance immunity in such cases
would have a significant economic impact on the neighboring
347
landowner.
The negative impact of CAFOs on neighboring
348
property values has been well established.
Assuming that the
neighboring landowner preceded the defendant’s change in
operation, the consideration of “investment-backed expectations”
could provide strong support in favor of a regulatory taking since the
349
extent of the nuisance was unknown at the time of purchase. This
determination would likely depend on the extent to which similar
facilities were already operating in the surrounding area.
On the other hand, the “character of the government action” in
this case may weigh against finding a compensable taking, particularly
considering the stated policy of the RTF law to “conserve and protect
and encourage the development and improvement of [ ] agricultural
350
land and forestland.” The ubiquitous nature of RTF laws across the
country and longstanding application in North Carolina provide
further support for finding the amended RTF law to be constitutional.
Nevertheless, the effective removal of many of the equitable
considerations under the “coming to the nuisance” doctrine raises
concerns about whether the amended RTF law represents a “public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
351
promote the common good.” As noted, the amended statute would
allow industrial agricultural facilities to effectively tack on prior
352
agricultural uses.
This retroactive application of the statute to
existing homeowners living near smaller farms also “implicates
353
fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings Clause”
and requires longstanding residents of a community to endure the
nuisance associated with CAFOs.
346. See supra Section III.D (discussing potential interpretations of the statute).
347. Richards & Richards, supra note 64, at 38–39.
348. Id.
349. In this sense, a case brought by a residential developer, as in Durham v. Britt,
presents a much more compelling case for finding an unconstitutional taking that those
presented the homeowner in Lindsey v. DeGroot due to their respective “investmentbacked expectations.” See Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 251, 451 S.E.2d 1, 1 (1994);
Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
350. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015). Indeed, the consideration of the cumulative
impacts of agricultural facilities on their surrounding communities may provide further
support for such a finding.
351. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
352. See supra notes 337–351 and accompanying text.
353. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (emphasizing the retroactive
imposition of liability as a factor in favor of finding a compensable taking).
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While North Carolina courts arguably have more leeway to find
354
that a compensable taking has occurred, a plaintiff would still likely
face a heavy burden bringing this claim absent evidence of a near or
355
total depreciation in value in the property. However, a neighboring
landowner may be able to argue that the grant of nuisance immunity
to an industrial agricultural or forestry facility constituted “a
substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the
356
ownership of the property.”
CONCLUSION
By extending nuisance immunity beyond the traditional doctrine
of “coming to the nuisance,” the North Carolina General Assembly
has provided an unreasonable framework to accomplish the stated
purpose of the law “to conserve and protect and encourage the
development and improvement of its agricultural land and
357
forestland” within the state.
In contrast to the limitations
358
previously recognized by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the
amended RTF law in North Carolina reflects a competing vision
about the future of agriculture within the state. The extensive
protections provided to all agricultural operations “without
limitation” fail to account for the rights of neighboring landowners
359
within these rural communities.
As a result of the 2013
amendments, it remains to be seen how the courts will interpret the
statutory revisions. However, the constitutional concerns raised by
these amendments favor a narrow interpretation of the law that is
consistent with the original intent of the act.
Contrary to the stated purpose of the law, the RTF law’s blanket
protections for CAFOs and industrial forestry operations against
nuisance claims by neighboring landowners raises legitimate
questions about what kind of agricultural land and forestland the
360
government should protect. As seen from William Aldred’s Case, as

354. As seen in Gacke, federal takings law does not preclude a state court from
providing additional protections for rights that may not be expressly recognized under the
United States Constitution. Gacke v. Pork Extra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa
2004); see Centner, supra note 140, at 140–41.
355. See supra notes 289–295 (discussing the interpretation of taking claims by North
Carolina state courts).
356. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., __, N.C. __, __, 786 S.E.2d 919, 925 (2016)
(quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 198–99, 293 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1982)).
357. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2015).
358. See supra Section II.C.
359. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(b) (2015).
360. See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738.
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well as the pending tort litigation in North Carolina, land use conflicts
between agricultural and non-agricultural uses will continue to create
tension between the respect for property rights as well as the best use
of North Carolina’s resources. The extensive protections provided to
agricultural facilities unduly limit the fair allocation of resources and
rights under the law. A more balanced approach is needed to provide
a sustainable model for agricultural development in the state.
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